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REASSESSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
DAVID

M. O'BRIEN t

Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Justice Oliver W. Holmes, dissenting in
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 1

I. INTRODUCTION

USTICE HOLMES ELOQUENTLY REMINDS US that "great
cases" do not emerge from ordinary constitutional litigation
solely by virtue of judicial craftsmanship or creativity, or a search
for "neutral principles" 2 of law. Instead, great cases arise from
shared judicial and public perception of the political salience of
the issues posed, as, for example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
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v. Sawyer8 and New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon
Papers).4 Justice Holmes' observation also points out that public
passions may infuse the Supreme Court with a special sense of
urgency that may prompt a sacrifice of the time needed for reflection and judicial craftsmanship. 5 Justice Holmes thus suggests that
the Court's public is as important for judicial decision-making as

the public's Court is for the maintenance of the constitutional
system.
Alexis de Tocqueville also noted this when he wrote that "[the
Court's] power is enormous, but it is the power of public opinion."
3. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the executive branch lacks the inherent
power to seize steel mills in order to prevent a strike that allegedly would have
adverse effects on the conduct of the nation's war in Korea).
4. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that the executive branch did
not meet the heavy presumption against prior restraints of expression in seeking to enjoin the publication of the contents of a classified policy study). For
a discussion of Pentagon Papers, see S. UNGER, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS
(1972). For an excellent comparison of Youngstown Sheet & Tube and Pentagon Papers, see Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3 (1971).
5. Dissenting in Pentagon Papers, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Harlan
and Blackmun, criticized the majority's "frenzied" process of rendering the
decision and its "feverish" consideration of the merits. 403 U.S. at 747-52
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 759-62
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, in particular, criticized the
New York Times for holding the documents for three months while its analysts
studied them and then pressuring the courts to render an immediate decision
when the government sought to enjoin their publication. Id. at 750 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice thereby points to the inconsistency of
publishers invoking the public's right to know in arguing against prior restraints, while "the Times, presumably in its capacity as trustee of the public's
,right to know,' . . . held up publication for purposes it considered proper and
Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
thus (delayed] public knowledge ......
See also id. at 752-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 759-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). William Hocking elucidates the inconsistency further by observing
that, "we say recklessly that [readers] have 'a right to know'; yet it is a right
which they are helpless to claim, for they do not know that they have the

right to know what as yet they do not know."

W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE
OF PRINCIPLE 170 (1947).
6. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 156-57 (Bradley ed. 1945).

PRESS: A FRAMEWORK

To recall Benjamin Cardozo's eloquent observation: "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass
the judges by." B. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
In addition to litigating claims to new rights in response to changing social
circumstances, the public exerts pressure on the Court through the judicial
process by means of amicus curiae briefs and public interest litigation, and
outside the judicial process by writing letters, or otherwise petitioning, individual justices; by publicized threats of impeachment, as with the campaign to
"Impeach Earl Warren"; or by threatening reorganization of the Court, as with
President Roosevelt's "Court Packing Plan." See, e.g., L. BAKER, BACK TO
BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967); R. HORN,
(1956); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (1941); C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959); Barker, Third Parties in
GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Litigation: A Systematic View of the Judicial Function, 29 J. POL. 41 (1967);
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 702-04 (1963).
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Neither Justice Holmes nor de Tocqueville, however, envisioned
the "rights revolution" 7 of the last three decades as the result of
the proclivity of members of the public to vindicate their special
interests by claiming new "rights." The rights revolution underscores the importance of the Court's public by indicating the profound significance for constitutional interpretation of the broader
practice of rights within the polity.8 This, in turn, compels greater
attention to constitutional language and the symbolic appeal of
demands that the Supreme Court articulate unenumerated rights.9
During the last two decades, members of the public, and especially the press, have increasingly asserted the constitutional
legitimacy of a "right to know." The controversy over The Progressive magazine article, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It,
Why We're Telling It, epitomizes the wide symbolic appeal and
broad political consequences of claims to the public's right to
know.10 In United States v. The Progressive,Inc.," District Judge
Warren granted a preliminary injunction against the publication of
7. The civil rights movement of the 1950's and the 1960's led in the 1970's
to increasing demands for equal rights and for protection from discrimination
of such diverse groups as women, the elderly, the physically handicapped, homosexuals, indigents and inmates in penal and mental institutions. See, e.g.,
CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1978);
M. KONVITZ,
EXPANDING LIBERTIES: FREEDOM'S GAINS IN POSTWAR AMERICA

(1966); THE PULSE

OF FREEDOM: AMERICAN LIBERTIES 1920-1970 (Reitman ed. 1975). The rights
revolution secured fundamental political changes, at the cost of further entangling the courts in public policy formulation and implementation, and controversy over an "imperial judiciary." See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST
104 (1975).
8. For discussions of the practice of rights and constitutional language, see
J. BRIGHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE (1978); R. FLATHAM, THE PRACrICE OF
RIGHTS

(1976).

9. The Supreme Court has recognized several unenumerated rights. For
example, the Court has interjected the first amendment to safeguard the right
to receive information, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation violated the first amendment
rights of those desiring to distribute literature and those desiring to receive it),
and the right of associational privacy, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (state's attempt to compel disclosure of NAACP's
membership list violated the right to associate freely with others). Cf. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (recognizing a woman's qualified right to
terminate her pregnancy within her fourteenth amendment right of privacy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing a right of
marital privacy under the fourteenth amendment which was infringed by a
state statute forbidding use of contraceptives).
10. Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling
It, 43 THE PROGRESSIVE 14-24 (Nov. 1979). For background on the case and
the publisher's understanding of the issues, see Knoll, Born Secret, 43 THE
PROGRESSIVE 12-27 (May 1979); Buell, On Science and Secrecy, 43 THE PROGRESSIVE 34-40 (May 1979).
11. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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the article.1 2 Acknowledging that the injunction "will infringe
upon [the public's] right to know and to be informed," 13 Judge
Warren concluded that "this Court can find no plausible reason
why the public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen
bomb construction to carry on an informed debate on this issue." 14
The Department of Justice subsequently withdrew its request for
an injunction against publication of the article, following the printing of a similar article by another Madison, Wisconsin periodical.' 5
The Progressive case nevertheless bore the attributes of a great case
in that it focused public attention on a basic dilemma in constitutional interpretation, namely, that of reconciling first amendment
freedoms with governmental interests in national security." Although the case is now moot, its political and legal importance
persists because there remain the vexatious problems of determining
the legitimacy and limits of the public's right to know.
Claims to the constitutional legitimacy of a right to know may
not be dismissed as extravagant demands of embittered journalists. 17
12. Id. at 1000.
13. Id. at 996.
14. Id. at 994.
15. Independent of Mr. Morland's research and article for THE PROGRESSIVE, Charles Hansen, a computer programmer in California, prepared a similar
18 page story and letter on the construction of H-bombs, published by The
Press Connection, a small daily newspaper in Madison, Wisconsin, on September 16, 1979. Subsequently, The Chicago Tribune also published Mr. Hansen's
letter. As a consequence, the government abandoned its efforts to enjoin THE
PROGRESSIVE magazine's publication of the Morland article. See N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1979, § A, at 1,
col. 1. See also O'Toole, H-Bomb Letter Called "Good Road Map," Washington Post, Sept. 24, 1979, § A, at 15, col. 1. As a further result of Progressive,
the government discovered that many documents pertaining to the construction
of H-bombs had been mistakenly declassified and made available for public
inspection at regional offices of the Atomic Energy Commission in Los Alamos,
New Mexico. See Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1979, § A, at 7, col. 1.
16. For discussions of the competing claims to first amendment protection
and governmental withholding of information in the interests of national security, see Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case
of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273-74 (1971); Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 111
(1976); Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know
Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1957); Note, Access to
Government Information and the Classification Process-Is There a Right to
Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814, 831-32 (1971); Note, The National Security Exception
to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 214, 218-21 (1971).
For further discussion, see notes 312-60 and accompanying text infra.
17. Several members of the Court have taken seriously first amendment
claims to a constitutionally protected right to know. See notes 40-48 and
accompanying text infra. The press has also made claims that their particular
interest in news reporting should be entitled to constitutional protection under
the first amendment and assailed the Burger Court's treatment of those claims
as establishing "a dangerous pattern" that "for all practical purposes [consti-
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Rather, such claims must be taken seriously both because of their
symbolic appeal and because the Court's articulation of unenumerated rights may have profound consequences for constitutional
law and public policy.'
Further, several members of the Supreme
Court 19 and a number of prominent first amendment scholars defend the constitutional legitimacy of the right to know. 20 Thomas
Emerson, for example, argues that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized in a number of cases that the first amendment embodies a
constitutional guarantee of the right to know." 21 The right to
know, according to Emerson, "focuses on the affirmative aspects of
the first amendment and the system of freedom of expression." 22
In other words, the right to know attains constitutional status as a
kind of composite right that unifies previously recognized penumbral first amendment rights to receive or gather information 28 and
to acquire access to governmental institutions and materials, 24 as
25
well as buttresses the policy against prior restraints.
tutes a] war against the press."
NEWSWEEK,

Alpern & Camper, The Court and the Press,

June 26, 1978, at 12.

18. Dissenting from the Court's fashioning of a right of privacy in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Black succinctly and prophetically
warned that "use of any such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make
of this Court's members a day-to-day constitutional convention." Id. at 507
(Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the developing constitutional law
of privacy, see generally D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1979).
19. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
20. Brant, The Constitution and the Right to Know, in MASS MEDIA AND
THE LAW 73 (Clark & Hutchison eds. 1970); Emerson, Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. L.Q. 1, 6-8; Hennings, The People's Right to
Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 669-70 (1959); Horton, The Public's Right to Know,
3 N.C. CENT. L.J. 123 (1972); Kutner, Freedom of Information: Due Process
of the Right to Know, 18 CATH. LAW. 50 (1972); Parks, supra note 16, at 6-13;
Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: A National
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REv. 630, 632-33 (1968).
21. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 755 (1977) (footnote omitted). See also
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 94-95, 463-65, 613-14,
649-50, 671-73 (1970).
22. See Emerson, supra note 20, at 2.
23. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 114-41 and accompanying
text infra. See also Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); Comment, Freedom to Hear: A4 Political Justification
of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311 (1971).
24. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 142-70 and accompanying text
infra. See also Rockwell, The Public's Right to Know: Pelt v. Procunier and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 829 (1975); Note, The
Public's Right of Access to Government Information Under the First Amendment, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 164 (1974); Note, The Rights of the Public and

the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
25. For a discussion of the policy against prior restraints, see notes 289-360
and accompanying text infra. See also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
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Three basic justifications have been offered for the elevation of
the right to know to constitutional status: first, an historical finding
that the right to know expresses an underlying tenet of constitutionally limited government evident and endorsed during the founding period in debates over the ratification of the Constitution and
the adoption of the first amendment; second, a policy decision that,
regardless of constitutional history, the right attains legitimacy solely
upon policy considerations of the desirability of governmental openness; and third, a decision based on "constitutional common law" 28
that the right to know may be judicially created upon showing that
prior dicta and holdings on the first amendment have recognized,

albeit in a more limited or derivative fashion, the interest of the
public in knowing about governmental operations.
The strongest justification for a judicially-created constitutional
right to know would entail showing that all three arguments are
meritorious; that is, a right to know has some historical basis, would
likely prove auspicious, and has support in previous constitutional
rulings. 27 Weaker justifications might be accepted by more activist

jurists, admiring of the power of "robed legislators," 28 who might
demand only two of the three justifications. Of course, a purely
result-oriented 29 jurist might maintain that the anticipated benefit
of governmental openness per se provides an adequate basis for
establishing a directly enforceable constitutional right to know
against the government.
These three justifications for denominating a constitutional
right to know, however, are not equally meritorious and compelling.
That a right to know has legitimacy in historical perspective appears
26. See generally Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
27. Of course, all three rationales for a right to know would still not prove
persuasive for a jurist subscribing to a theory of strict construction or a literalist
interpretation of the first amendment, such as Justice Black. Justice Black's
criticisms of the Court's denomination of a "right of privacy" in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), are equally applicable to judicial creation of
a right to know. "One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a
constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words
of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and
more or less restricted in meaning." Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting). See also
H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1969).
28. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
YALE L.J. 1363, 1363 n.3 (1973).
29. See generally Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Ci-ii. L. REv. 661, 671-83 (1960); Mueller & Schwartz,
The Principleof Neutral Principles,7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 571 (1960).
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particularly ill-founded, indeed pretentious, in view of the debates
over the adoption of the Constitution and the first amendment and
the prevailing interpretations of the first amendment provided by
the Court and its commentators during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.30 I will not recount my arguments made elsewhere against claims of historical support for a right to know,3 1 but
simply indicate that, while freedom of information was deemed
essential to free government during the founding period, there was
no acceptance of claims that, under the first amendment, the public
has a directly enforceable right to demand access to otherwise inaccessible government information, or even an unqualified liberty
to publish with impunity. The most that may be asserted is
that the founders, as well as later commentators on the first amendment, comprehended that freedom of information was essential for
an informed public.
Nor will I rehearse my criticisms of the second claim that denomination of a directly enforceable right to know entails especially
auspicious consequences for the polity. 2 The political ideals of
freedom of information and an informed public are reflected in
the enumerated guarantees for freedom of speech and press, but
they do not require a constitutional right to know directly enforceable against the government. Indeed, the following examination of
claims to a right to know underscores the fact that judicial articulation of such a right might prove particularly pernicious in two ways.
First, the right to know inevitably leads to judicial determinations
of what the public does and does not have a right to know, and thus
invites restrictions on freedom of speech and press in the form of
prior restraints. Moreover, judicial creation and construction of
the contours of a directly enforceable right to know usurp congressional power to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of public
and press access to government information and facilities. 33
30. See

2

DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF

1787

52 (Elliot ed. 1901) (remarks of delegates Widery, Gorham, and Perly); id.,
vol. 3, at 169, 202-03, 233, 315, 396-98, 404, 409, 459-60 (statements of delegates
Mason, Henry, Marshall, Madison, and Randolph); id., vol. 4, at 72-73, 263,
284 (statements of delegates Pinckney, Graham, Iredell, Davie, and Franklin);
id., vol. 5, at 408 (statements of delegates Madison and Wilson). See also
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732, 756 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789); 2 T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886, 901-40 (8th ed. 1927); 3 .. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

735-36 (1833).

31. See O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know,"

7 HASTINGS

CONST.

L.Q. 579, 598-603 (1980).

32. See id. at 613-14.
33. See notes 142-287 and accompanying text infra.
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The third claim, advanced by Emerson and others, that the
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged the legitimacy of a
constitutional right to know remains to be considered. Although a
right to know appears neither meritorious in historical perspective,
nor likely to prove wholly beneficial in practice, the constitutional
common law argument for the right requires serious attention from
both lawyers defending first amendment claims and students of the
Supreme Court. If, as Emerson maintains, "[t]he Supreme Court
has recognized in a number of cases that the first amendment embodies a constitutional guarantee for a right to know," 34 then the
Court has adopted an expansive interpretation of the first amendment. Reconsideration of the Court's treatment of claims to a right
to know therefore becomes important in assessing the validity and
accuracy of Emerson's proclamations on the status of "an emerging
constitutional right," 35 and in clarifying the present Court's understanding of the scope of the first amendment.
A reassessment of the public's right to know and the Supreme
Court's first amendment analysis shows that arguments for a constitutional right to know, as well as criticisms of the Burger Court,
fundamentally confuse the political ideal of freedom of information
and an informed public with a directly enforceable right to know
under the first amendment. While rejecting claims to a first amendment right to know, the Supreme Court maintains that the express
guarantees of the first amendment in significant ways embody and
ensure the political ideal of freedom of information and an informed
public. The re-examination establishes that contemporary constitutional developments do not support the existence of a first amendment right to know. More importantly, it becomes clear that the
constitutional common law argument ultimately reduces to considerations of public policy, namely, whether the articulation of a
constitutional right to know would have beneficial consequences
and whether the Supreme Court is the proper institution to undertake such policy-making. This article concludes by examining the
Burger Court's recent treatment of claims to a first amendment
right to know, suggesting the problems confronting courts fashioning such a right, and proposing alternative and more appropriate
forums and strategies for members of the public and press to vindicate their interests in freedom of information and governmental
openness.
34. Emerson, supra note 21, at 755 (footnotes omitted).
35. Emerson, supra note 20, at 23.
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THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO KNOW

The origins of a right to know have less to do with the Supreme
Court's construction of the first amendment than with the public's,
and, especially, the media's. The contemporary understanding of
the first amendment, and, more generally, the Bill of Rights, departs
from the nineteenth and early twentieth century view of those
guarantees as only imposing limitations on the coercive powers of
government. By contrast, in the twentieth century, an increasing
number of scholars and members of the public have come to understand those basic guarantees as both providing limits on the power
of, and simultaneously imposing affirmative duties upon, the government.36 Accordingly, scholars such as Emerson, tend to presume
the constitutionality of a right to know when arguing that the
Supreme Court should shape the contours of the right by elaborating on first amendment rights to disseminate and to receive, gather,
or obtain access to information, and on the policy against prior
restraints.8 7 Thus, before examining the Supreme Court's treatment of claims to a right to know in these different areas of first
amendment litigation, the presumption of the constitutional legitimacy of a right to know bears further comment.
Emerson maintains that "the right to know focuses on the
affirmative aspects of the first amendment and the system of freedom
of expression, as well as simply looking at the negative right to be
free of governmental interferences." 38 Mindful of the manifest
difficulties in reconciling the right to know and the first amendment,
Emerson argues:
Reduced to its simplest terms the [right to know] includes
two closely related features: first, the right to read, to
listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications;
and second, the right to obtain information as a basis for
transmitting ideas or facts to others. Together these constitute the reverse side of the coin from the right to communicate. But the coin is one piece, namely the system of
39
freedom of expression.
36. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
37. See notes 20-25 and authorities cited therein.
38. Emerson, supra note 20, at 2 (emphasis added).
39. Emerson, supra note 20, at 2.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 26: p. I

Emerson further argues for the recognition of a right to know
by observing that
the right to know serves much the same function in our
society as the right to communicate. It is essential to
personal self-fullfillment. It is a significant method for
seeking the truth, or at least for seeking the better answer.
It is necessary for collective decision-making in a demo40
cratic society.
Emerson's contention that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized
in a number of cases that the first amendment embodies a constitutional guarantee of the right to know" 41 confuses the political ideal
of freedom of information safeguarded by the first amendment with
a directly enforceable right to know, and proves rebuttable upon a
careful reexamination of the Supreme Court's construction of the
first amendment and claims to a right to know.
As a matter of constitutional history, the first amendment has
been construed primarily to safeguard against restraints on the freedom of individuals and the press to communicate. 42 Consequently,
the scope of the amendment has traditionally fallen short of requiring affirmative action on the part of the government either to inform citizens about, or to grant them access to, policymaking institutions and processes. In other words, the first amendment has
been construed to guarantee individuals only the freedom from
restraints on their communications, but not the freedom to demand
and obtain information from governmental and nongovernmental
4
sources. 3
40. Id.
41. Emerson, supra note 21, at 755.
42. The Supreme Court has extended first amendment protection to various
modes of disseminating information. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (commercial advertisements); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
389-90 (1969) (radio broadcasting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89
1967) (magazine article); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (dicta)
television); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (noncommercial advertisements); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957)
(literature); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (motion
pictures); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (picketing); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (pamphlets and leaflets).
43. Justice Stevens, during his address on September 8, 1979, at the University of Arizona College of Law Dedication, characterized this distinction as
a "general rule" of the first amendment. After reiterating Justice Blackmun's
observation in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 411 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting), that "this Court heretofore has not found, and does not today
find, any First Amendment right of access to judicial or other government
proceedings," he proposed that "[t]hat statement fairly identifies what one
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Although pluralities of the Court have affirmed the import of
freedom of information and an informed public as an abstract
principle when construing first amendment guarantees,4 a majority
of the Court nevertheless has not legitimated a directly enforceable
right to know under the first amendment. Indeed, a majority has
specifically rejected first amendment claims for news reporters'
special privileges to maintain the confidentiality of their sources, 45
and obtain access to prisons so that they may inform the public
about conditions there.4 6 Furthermore, a majority of the Burger
Court recently rejected claims that the first amendment gives the
press an affirmative right of access to pre-trial proceedings. 47 The
proposition that the public or the press is entitled to an affirmative
and enforceable right to know has been endorsed only by individual
might characterize as a 'general rule' that is now on the firing line." Stevens,
Some Thoughts About a General Rule, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 602 (1979).
According to Justice Stevens, "[t]he rule draws a sharp distinction between the
dissemination of information and ideas, on the one hand, and the acquisition
of newsworthy matter on the other." Id. Moreover, he concluded: "Whereas
the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the former, it has never
squarely held that the latter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever." Id.
44. In six cases, the Court has dealt with first amendment claims by individuals or the press to disseminate information: Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978) (release of presidential tapes not required by first amendment where a judicial appeal concerning them is pending);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (recognizing first amendment protection of commercial speech); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 99-100 (1974) (obscenity); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reexamining the standards by
which obscene materials may be determined to be subject to censorship); CBS
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-03 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept editorial advertisements); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218-20 (1966) (invalidating state statute prohibiting publication of editorial);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (travel to Cuba not protected by a first
amendment right to be informed about the effects of foreign policy).
Another three cases dealt with the right to receive materials from, or obtain
access to, government facilities: Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-12
(1978) (refusal to admit media to prison not unconstitutional); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974) (prohibition of press interviews
with prisoners no violation of freedom of press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 821-24 (1974) (prison inmates have no first amendment rights to press
interviews).
Finally, in one case, the Court has dealt with the right of the press to
maintain the confidentiality of their sources: Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
691 (1972) (first amendment does not exempt reporters from having to answer
questions in grand jury investigation).
45. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 692 (1972).
46. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827-28, 834-35 (1974).
47. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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justices in dissenting or concurring opinions. 4 A full assessment
of the status of the right to know as an emerging constitutional
right, however, requires a re-examination of the Supreme Court's
specific treatment of claims to a right to know with regard to first
amendment protections for disseminating and receiving information
and with respect to the policy against prior restraints.
A. Popular Information and the Right to Know
The symbolic appeal of the first amendment for both the
Court and the public and its central place in our constitutional
democracy has commended the general principle that "freedom of
expression is the rule and constraint the exception." 49 Precisely
because the Court has understood that "[the amendment's] guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit
of all of us," 1o the scope of the amendment protects a wide range of
means of communication.5 1 Accordingly, although acknowledging
that "[t]he Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play
an important role in the discussion of public affairs," 52 the Court
historically has been reluctant to provide the institutional press
with special privileges.53 Thus, the guarantees for freedom of
speech and press might be seen to be, in a constitutional sense, redundant: the first amendment fundamentally guarantees two equal
and interdependent means for the expression of ideas and the dissemination of information.
48. See id. at 397-403 (Powell, J., concurring); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 141 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,

417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 850 (Powell, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 836 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 165

(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78
(1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
49. Emerson, supra note 25, at 655.
50. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).

51. See note 42 supra and authorities cited therein.
52. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting newspaper editorials on election day).
53. See generally Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 225 (P. Kurland ed. 1968);
Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom
of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss1/1

12

O'Brien: Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in

1980-1981]

REASSESSING THE RIGHT TO

KNOW

1. Press Privileges-Freedomfrom Governmental Inquiries
First amendment rulings indicate the Court's view that, from a
constitutional perspective, the public's interests in obtaining popular information and debating vital issues are too precious either to
permit unjustified restraints on public distribution of information
and ideas or to depend solely on the institutional press to accomplish that distribution. Accordingly, Justice White, writing for the
majority in Branzburg v. Hayes,54 rejected the claim that the first
amendment grants a constitutional testimonial privilege for newspaper reporters refusing to disclose their sources of information
about criminal activities before grand juries.55
By contrast, in the course of his strong dissent, Justice Douglas
wrote that: "[T]he press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen
apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right
to know." 56 By construing it to embody a constitutional right to
know, Justice Douglas' opinion advanced the most expansive interpretation of the first amendment. The Justice departed from both
the majority and his fellow dissenters in rejecting the prevailing
view of the first amendment as a guarantee only against inhibitions
54. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court,
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist

joined.

For various appraisals of claims to a newsman's privilege, see Blasi,

The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971);
Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 709 (1975); Sacco, Branzburg, Caldwell, and Pappas4 Quick Lateral Pass to Congress, 8 NEw ENG. L. REV. 336 (1973); Note, The
Rights of Sources-The Critical Element in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege,
88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979).

55. 408 U.S. at 708-09. Branzburg decided four cases. In three of them,
reporters had refused to reveal their sources, or information obtained through
them, to an investigating grand jury. In the remaining case, a reporter refused
to appear before the grand jury at all. Id. at 667-79.

The reporters argued

that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify
the source of information published or to publish only part of the

facts revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to

reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified and
other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of
the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 679-80.

Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "[i]t has generally

been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a Constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally." Id. at 684, citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
56. 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice
Douglas reiterated his quarrel with the majority's interpretation of the first
amendment and claims to the right to know in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 165 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring), wherein he insisted that "[t]he

right of the people to know has been greatly undermined by our decisions
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on the free distribution of information. 57 His opinion registered
his belief in the constitutional legitimacy of a first amendment
affirmative right to know such as would justify special privileges for
the press because of its important role in informing the public.58
On the other hand, Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, argued only that "[t]he
reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship with
his sources stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free
flow of information to the public," 59 without maintaining that the
first amendment confers upon the public a directly enforceable constitutional right to know extending unqualified protection to reporters gathering information. Indeed, although Justice Stewart
adopted a broad view of the first amendment in Branzburg,6 0 he
subsequently appeared to accept the position of the majority when
he wrote:
[I]f freedom of press means simply freedom of speech for
reporters, this question of a reporter's asserted right to
withhold information would have answered itself. None
of us-as individuals-has a "free speech" right to refuse to
tell a grand jury the identity of someone who has given us
information relevant to the grand jury's legitimate inquiry.6 1
The majority in Branzburg correctly discerned that "[t]he heart
of the claim [for a first amendment newsman's privilege] is that the
burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to
disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest [reflected in a grand jury's investigation] in obtaining the information." 62 The majority rejected that claim, pointing out that the
amendment does not isolate the press with a privilege of confirequiring, under pain of contempt, a reporter to disclose the source of the
information he comes across in investigative reporting." Id.
57. 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 712, 721-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 725-26 & n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart focused on the
right to gather news, which he found to imply a right to confidentiality of
sources. Id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Balancing society's interest in
the effective use of grand juries against the reporters' right to confidentiality
of sources, he concluded that the government's ability to compel disclosure was
limited to carefully circumscribed situations. Id. at 736, 743 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
61. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 635 (1975) (wherein he
explains his structuralist theory of the press clause of the first amendment).
62. 408 U.S. at 681.
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dentiality for its sources any more than it grants the press special
access for newsgathering63
The disagreement between the majority and Justice Douglas
in Branzburg, and, more generally, over the constitutional legitimacy of special privileges for the press, does not turn on the import
of first amendment protection for freedom of information. The
justices agree that the public has legitimate interests in knowing
about current events and vital issues pertaining to their selfgovernance. Their disagreement centers on the nature and scope
of the first amendment with respect to claims to a right to know.
In other words, whereas Justice Douglas suggested that the amendment implies a directly enforceable right to know,64 the majority
of the Court apparently believed that the specific rights guaranteed
by the first amendment are sufficient to adequately ensure the political ideal of freedom of information and an informed public. Nevertheless, the issues raised in Branzburg did not require a determination of whether the first amendment embodies a directly enforceable
right to know or simply an important abstract principle registering
the public's legitimate interests in popular information. The question in that case was simply whether the first amendment invests
the press with special testimonial privileges because "[i]n seeking
out the news the press ... acts as an agent of the public at large." 11
Resolution of that question did not entail determining the nature
and scope of a right to know. Indeed, Justice Douglas' reliance
on claims to a right to know obscures the issue of whether the
Constitution mandates any special privileges for the press by assuming that the press alone serves as a conduit for popular information and an informed public.
2. Popular Information and the Problem of Obscenity
The fact that claims to the public's right to know are often
simply a pretense for an expansive construction of the first amendment is also evident in other areas of controversy over the scope of
the amendment. Although "a central tenet of the First Amendment
63. See note 55 supra.
64. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra. Justice Douglas has
elsewhere acknowledged, however, that "there may be situations and occasions
in which the right to know must yield to other compelling and overriding
interests." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 643 n.10 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See Emerson, supra note 20, at 19.
65. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell,.J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of Saxbe, see notes 144-53 and accompanying
text infra.
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[is] that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas," 6 the government inevitably and justifiably enters this
marketplace when safeguarding the conditions for each individual's
exercise of first amendment freedoms-for example, when securing
and maintaining a public forum 67 for the exercise of those freedoms
66. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1979) (citations
omitted).
67. The concept of a "public forum" was well articulated by Justice
Roberts in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (ordinance forbidding distribution of printed material and holding of public meetings held unconstitutional):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
rivilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
or communication of views on national questions may be regulated
in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
The Court's fashioning of first amendment protection for a public forum
underscores the importance of the availability of information and the opportunity to discuss wide-ranging opinions, and hence, the legitimacy of the public's right to know as a broad political principle, if not a directly enforceable
right. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 319-20 (1968) (freely accessible shopping center serving as the community business block held to be a public forum where the activity was related
to the shopping center's operations); Niemotkou v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
271 (1951) (denial of permits for use of a public park must be based on
"narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards"). In other cases, the
Court has rejected claims to first amendment protection as public forums. See,
e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (holding
that buses containing advertising placards are not public forums); Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-70 (1972) (shopping center not a public forum for
handbilling on matters unrelated to the operation of the center); Adderly v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1966) (driveway of county jail is not open for
public use and demonstrations).
In Lehman, Justice Blackmun stated that:
No First Amendment forum is here to be found. The city consciously
has limited access to its transit system advertising space in order to
minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk
of imposing upon a captive audience. These are reasonable legislative
objectives advanced by the city in a proprietary capacity. In these
circumstances, there is no First or Fourteenth Amendment violation.
418 U.S. at 304. In his dissent, however, Justice Brennan countered that
"[oince a public forum for communication has been established, both free
speech and equal protection principles prohibit discrimination based solely
upon subject matter or content." Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
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by imposing reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the
dissemination of ideas and information. 8 Furthermore, as in
English common law governing freedom of speech and press, 69 the
Supreme Court maintains that a first amendment right "is not an
absolute one, and the State in the exercise of its police power may
punish the abuse of this freedom." 70 The majority of the Court
continues to hold that some speech receives no first amendment
protection upon the rationale articulated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire:71
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words ....
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
72
social interest in order and morality.

While there has never been general agreement among the justices
in interpreting the first amendment, the Court has established some
general areas where the protection of the amendment is limited.
supplied by Justice Brennan) (footnote omitted). Indeed, Justice Blackmun's
opinion in that case is difficult to square with his later opinion for the majority
in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), where the
Court invalidated as a prior restraint a municipal board's refusal to permit the
musical stage production of "Hair" in the city-leased theater it managed. Id.
at 552.
68. The Supreme Court has upheld reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations applied in an evenhanded fashion. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) (upholding a conviction under ordinance
forbidding disturbing noisemaking near school buildings while class is in
session); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (upholding a statute
forbidding the obstruction of public passages, while reversing a conviction
thereunder because of the unlimited discretion permitted in the statute's enforcement); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding
reasonable license fees for use of public streets for parades).
69. See O'Brien, supra note 31, at 590-603.
70. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (invalidating those
segments of a state statute which prohibited display of a flag or symbol in
opposition to the government, while upholding other segments prohibiting
utterances inciting violence, crime or overthrow of the government).
71. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (upholding state law prohibiting offensive
words against another lawfully in a public place).
72. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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For example, libel, 73 "fighting words," 74 and obscenity 75 all fall
outside absolute first amendment protection.
Within the areas of speech determined to be "no essential part
of any exposition of ideas" 7 -indeed, "utterly without redeeming
social importance" 7 7-the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution permits government to regulate the conditions for disseminating such information and to define its content. 78

Thus, it can

hardly be said that the Court has recognized in the public an unqualified right to know about expressions of libel, personal abuse
and obscenity.
Justice Douglas argued, however, that the public has a constitutionally protected interest in knowing about expressions of obscenity and the like. In Miller v. California79 and Hamling v.
United States,80 Justice Douglas, dissenting from the Court's reaffirmation that obscene materials are excluded from first amendment protection, repeated Emerson's arguments that "the right to
know is the corollary of the right to speak or publish." 8 As Justice
Douglas expressed it: "[I]mbedded in the First Amendment is the
philosophy that the people have the right to know. Sex is more
important to some than to others but it is of some importance
to all." 82
73. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times
Although Gertz and New York Times
imposed limits on libel actions against the media, depending on the nature of
the plaintiff, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347, 350; New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, neither foreclosed the use of libel
actions altogether. Indeed, the Court stated in Gertz that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." 418 U.S. at 340.
74. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572. For a discussion
of Chaplinsky, see notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra. Although the
Court continues to acknowledge that speech constituting "fighting words" may
be prohibited, the cases nevertheless indicate that statutes proscribing such
speech must be narrowly drawn. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (striking down a statute punishing the use of "opprobrious"
language against a policeman on duty).
75. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (reaffirming that
obscene material is not protected by the first amendment and setting forth
standards of obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957)
(obscenity held not to be constitutionally protected speech).
76. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572.
77. Roth v. United States, 854 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
78. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
79. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
80. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
81. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See notes
39-40 and accompanying text supra.
82. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 141 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Such reliance on a right to know to support individuals' first
amendment claims to freely distribute whatever they desire is misplaced. The constitutional issues raised by prosecutions for obscenity do not concern the public's interests in receiving information
about sex education, but rather the permissibility of the legal enforcement of public morality. 3 Moreover, resolution of controversies over the scope of the first amendment regarding libelous or
obscene materials does not require a determination of whether the
public has a constitutionally protected right to know. Justice Black,
an ardent opponent of libel and obscenity prosecutions, argued
simply that individuals have "an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish" 8 under the first amendment. The invocations of a right to know improperly inject considerations of the
rights of the audience, persons generally not before the court in
such cases. The Court does, however, remain sensitive to the ideal
of public information and an informed public when construing
the contours of the first amendment. Over the last decade, a majority of the Court has, for example, extended first amendment protection to commercial speech 8 and reaffirmed the rights of the
press to publish information obtained from public records. 86
3. Popular Information and Commercial Speech
The Burger Court's treatment of claims to first amendment
protection for commercial speech is particularly instructive regarding the Court's analysis of the extent of the amendment's protection
of popular information and an informed public. Until Bigelow v.
Virgina,87 commercial speech appeared to constitute a category of
unprotected speech under the first amendment. 88 Bigelow, an edi83. See H.

CLOR, OBSCENITY AND

PUBLIC MORALITY 175-209 (1969).

84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
85. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Citizens Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1976).
86. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). The
Burger Court continues to maintain that "[s]ince the press serves as an information gathering agent of the public, it could not be prevented from reporting
what it had learned and what the public was entitled to know." Id. See
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1979) (upheld publication of the name of a juvenile offender obtained by monitoring police radio
frequency); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-45
(1978) (struck down statute imposing criminal sanction for breach of confi-

dentiality of proceedings before Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Com-

mission); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (right
to publish name of rape victim obtained from public records).
87. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See notes 89-94 and accompanying text infra.
88. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (commission order prohibiting sex-based clas-
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tor of a weekly newspaper, was convicted, under a Virginia statute
prohibiting anyone from, "by publication, lecture, advertisement,
or by sale or circulation of any publication . . . encourag[ing] or
prompt[ing] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." 89 Bigelow
had published an advertisement for an abortion clinic located in
the state of New York. 90 With Justices Rehnquist and White dissenting, 9' the Court held that the statute infringed upon Bigelow's
first amendment rights. In so deciding the case, the Court limited
the commercial speech doctrine, first enunciated in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,92 to the extent of holding that "commercial aspects"
of and "publisher's motives of financial gain" from advertisements
do not "negate all First Amendment guarantees." 93 Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority:
[T]he advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers
possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the
subject matter or the law of another State and its94 development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.
The following term, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting,
the Court extended its finding that public interests in commercial
speech justify first amendment protection. In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"5 the
Court struck down limitations upon the advertising of prescription
drug sales on the ground that the first amendment is "primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy." 96
Justice Blackmun, again writing the majority opinion, stated:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic desifications in employment advertisements held constitutional); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (dictum) (commercial speech not protected); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942) (city ordinance for.
bidding distribution of advertising handbills held constitutional).
89. 421 U.S. at 811-14.
90. Id. at 812.
91. 421 U.S. at 829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White joined justice
Rehnquist's dissent. Id.
92. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
93. 421 U.S. at 818.
94. Id. at 822.
95. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
96. Id. at 765.
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cisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To
this end, the free flow of commercial information is indis97
pensible.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, maintained his opposition to the
Court's extension of the scope of the first amendment protection.
He rejected Justice Blackmun's public interest rationale with the
quip: "I cannot distinguish between the public's right to know the
price of drugs and its right to know the price of title searches or
physical examinations or other professional services for which
standardized fees are charged." 98 He further condemned what he
understood to be the majority's implicit acceptance of a right to
know: "It is undoubtedly arguable that many people in the country
regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be
elected to local, state, or national political office, but that does not
automatically bring information about competing shampoos within
the protection of the First Amendment." 9
Justice Rehnquist's misgivings about his colleagues' treatment
of claims to protected commercial speech were misplaced, however,
in as much as he equated the majority's concern with broadly construing first amendment safeguards for popular information with
the construction of a constitutional right to know. The Virginia
State Board Court did not recognize a right to know, but merely
construed the first amendment to protect the right of sellers to
advertise prices and thereby guarantee the public's interests in vital
information. 10 0 While it is true that the Court permitted a consumer group to bring the action,' 0 ' it did so on the basis of a right
to receive information 10 2 -a right previously recognized by the
Court and analytically distinguishable from an independently enforceable right to know. 10 3 The right to receive presumes a willing
speaker prevented by government interference from reaching the
intended listener, while a right to know requires a listener seeking
97. Id.
98. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 760-61, 773.
101. See id. at 756-57.
102. See id. The Court stated that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there
is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these
appellees [the consumer group]." Id. at 757 (footnote omitted) (emphasis

added).
103. See notes 107-70 and accompanying text infra.
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to obtain information in spite of an unwilling speaker. The regulation involved in Virginia State Board did not prohibit buyers
from learning drug prices, but restrained pharmacists from advertising them. 10 4 In addition, the relief sought and granted did not
include affirmatively requiring pharmacists to advertise, but merely
limited the state's power to prohibit advertising. Thus pharmacists
still need not advertise if they choose not to. 1° 5 The Court further
recognized the continuing power of government to impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulation and restrictions on "false,
deceptive, and misleading commercial speech" in order to protect
the public. 0 Thus, the Court has not recognized a right to know
in the commercial speech area, but has merely acknowledged the
general public interest in a free flow of information by protecting
the right of the seller to advertise.
B. First Amendment Affirmative Action: the Right to Know and
Rights to Receive and Obtain Access to Information
Since the first amendment "protects the structure of communications necessary for the existence of our democracy," 107 the aura
of the political ideal of freedom of information and an informed
public also encourages arguments for a constitutional right to know
in order to support claims to receive and obtain access to information that arguably has redeeming social importance but to which
the government, nevertheless, withholds or restricts public access.
Such claims pose vexatious problems in determining what the first
amendment requires and permits, and Emerson's argument that the
right to know expresses a corollary of first amendment unenumerated rights commands greater attention. 10 As Justice Marshall
has observed:
[I]n a variety of contexts this Court has held that the
First Amendment protects the right to receive information
and ideas, the freedom to hear as well as the freedom to
speak. The reason for this is that the First Amendment
104. See 425 U.S. at 749-50.

105. See id. at 749-50, 773.
106. See id. at 771-72. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979)

(state statute prohibiting optometric advertisements under a trade name held
not violative of first amendment).
107. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGF S L. REV. 173 (1979).
108. See Emerson, supra note 20, at 2.
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protects a process . . . and the right to speak and hearincluding the right to inform others and to be informed
about public issues-are inextricably part of that process.
The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin. But the
coin itself is the process of thought and discussion. 10 9
Thus, Justice Marshall, like Emerson, analyzed these first amendment freedoms with the metaphor of a coin; the first amendment is
seen to guarantee freedom from restraints on the distribution of
information and ideas and, on the other side, to guarantee a freedom
to receive or acquire access to information and ideas." 0
The simplicity of the metaphor, however, proves beguiling.
Justice Marshall, for instance, concludes that "[t]he First Amendment means that Government has no power to thwart the process
of free discussion, to 'abridge' the freedoms necessary to make that
process work." I' So too the Court's commentators readily argue:
"It is obvious that the freedom of the press implies the right to
gather news and the right of those who possess information to impart news." 112 However, it does not follow from the Court's acknowledgement of a right to receive that, as Emerson urges, "the
constitutional right to know embraces the right of the public to
obtain information from the government." 118
1. The Right to Receive and Governmental Restraints
Dictum in Martin v. City of Struthers114 that "freedom [of
speech and press] necessarily protects the right to receive" 115 provided the genesis for claims to a constitutional right to receive.
Subsequent cases elaborated the right as a corollary of the first
amendment applicable to disseminating materials about organized
109. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. See Emerson, supra note 20, at 2.

111. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 776 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Parks, supra note 16, at 10 (emphasis in original).
113. Emerson, supra note 20, at 14.
114. 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (striking down a city ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door canvassing and distribution of leaflets as an abridgment of first
amendment rights).
115. Id. at 143.
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labor, 116 religious," 7 educational," 8 political matters, 1 9 commercial
speech l20 and personal correspondence.' 21 In these cases the Court
clearly understood any right to receive to exist only as a corollary
of the enumerated rights in the first amendment. For example,
116. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (recognizing labor
organizer's right to speak and the rights of workers "to hear what he had to
say," and therefore striking down as an abridgment of these rights a state statute
requiring labor organizers to obtain a card before soliciting workers).
117. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 143, 146. See also Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (invalidating company town's prohibition on
the distribution of religious literature on town streets without permission).
118. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (dictum)
(investigation into teacher's beliefs and political associations held to violate first
amendment rights).
119. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965) (procedure withholding delivery of communist political propaganda sent through
the mails pending addressee's notification of his desire to receive it held unconstitutional); id. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explicitly relying on a
right to receive information).
120. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. at 756-57. For a discussion of Virginia State Board, see
notes 95-106 and accompanying text supra. See also Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (affirming the FCC's "fairness doctrine").
The Red Lion Court stated: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... . Id. at 390. The Court further declared: "It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
. ..It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences .... ." Id. (citations omitted).
121. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407-09 (1974) (invalidating prisoner mail censorship regulations). In Martinez, the Court relied heavily on
the addressee's right to receive mail in order to avoid determining whether
prisoners had the same first amendment rights as free persons. See id. The
Court stated:
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing
words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by
the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in
securing that result, and censorship of the communication between
them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status
of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider,
it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on
whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of
direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. .

.

. We do not deal here

with difficult questions of the so-called "right to hear" and third-party
standing but with a particular means of communication in which the
interests of both parties are inextricably meshed. The wife of a prison
inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to
say to her has suffered an abridgement of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her
letter to him. In either event, censorship of prisoner mail works a
consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendments
[sic] rights of those who are not prisoners.
Id. at 408-09 (footnote & citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 22 explained: "We rest on the narrow ground that the
addressee in order to receive his mail must request in writing that it
be delivered. This amounts in our judgment to an unconstitutional
abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 123 Justice
Douglas thereby construed the right to receive as a reciprocal right
with respect to the express guarantees of the first amendment.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Lamont, was prepared to go even
further:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access to publications. However, the
protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific
guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those
equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . I think the
right to receive publications is such a fundamental right. 24
The principal advantages and policy considerations of legitimating an independent and enforceable right to receive and right
to know, Emerson thinks, are especially compelling in those situations in which
the speaker, who is normally the party most likely to seek
vindication of the right to free expression, may not be in
a position to assert that right, and the listener or reader
may find it necessary to defend the right of expression by
invoking the constitutional right to know. From a procedural point of view the right to know may give standing
to the recipients or potential recipients of the communi2
cation. 5
The right to receive, however, has not been extended any further
than to protect intended recipients of information from governmental interference with voluntarily disseminated information. 2 6
The right to receive thus exists only as a necessary coordinate of
122. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See note 119 supra.
123. 381 U.S. at 307.
124. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Emerson, supra note 21, at 755. See also Emerson, supra note 20, at
4; O'Brien, supra note 31, at 609-10.
126. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. at 756-57; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407-09 (1974).
Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738-39 (1970) (right
of householders to receive mail includes the right not to receive "erotically
arousing" mail). For a discussion of cases regarding access to governmental
materials and facilities, see notes 142-70 and accompanying text infra.
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the right to speak. That is, the right does not entitle a person to
claim a right to receive information unless another has exercised
his first amendment right to disseminate that information. In short,
the right to receive is not tantamount to a first amendment right
to know enforceable against a person holding information but unwilling to disseminate it.
The Burger Court, in its initial opportunity to consider the
merits of claims to a right to receive, dealt with precisely this situation, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,127 and found that any infringement
of first amendment rights to receive information was not a limit
upon the government's bona fide exercise of discretion in the exclusion of aliens.128 The case arose when the Attorney General
refused to grant a temporary nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian journalist and Marxist theoretician whom American organizers had invited to participate in academic conferences and discussions. 29 In
framing the issue for the six-member majority, Justice Blackmun
wrote:
The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue
whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee
professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate
with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that
Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, in
other words, to compel the Attorney General to allow
Mandel's admission.8 0
After acknowledging previous cases citing a first amendment right
to receive,' 8' the Court ruled that when the Attorney General decides for a legitimate reason to refuse to grant a visa to an alien, as
authorized by Congress, courts may not weigh his decision against
the first amendment interests of those desiring to communicate with
the alien. 32 By contrast, the dissenters argued that the first amendment "involves not only the right to speak and publish but also
the right to hear, to learn, to know." 133 Justice Douglas, therefore,
would have permitted discretionary exclusion of aliens only where
there are issues of "national security, importation of drugs, and the
127.
128.
129.
130.

408 U.S. 753 (1972).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 756-59.
Id. at 762.

131. Id. at 762-63, citing inter alia Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395

U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
132. 408 U.S. at 770.
133. 408 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 774 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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like," 14 and Justice Marshall would have required the showing of
a compelling governmental interest outweighing the infringement
of first amendment rights to hear and be informed. 1 5 The majority
rejected these interpretations where the governmental control of
immigration was involved.
Kleindienst complements the Warren Court's decision seven
years earlier in Zemel v. Rusk,"38 upholding the secretary of state's

passport restrictions for travel to Cuba authorized by the Passport
Act of 1926 1' and the Immigration and Nationality Act. 138 In
Zemel, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, acknowledged
that the restriction "renders less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country," 139 but also pointed to the dangers
and absurdities of constructing a broad right to know:
There are few restrictions on action which could not
be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased
data flow. For example, the prohibition on unauthorized
entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant
to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but
that does not make entry into the White House a First
Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestricted right to gather information. 140

The majority in Zemel, like that in Kleindienst, comprehended
that the first amendment does not guarantee unlimited and unconditional liberties, nor does it confer upon the public an unqualified
right to receive or right to know. As Justice Stewart succinctly put
it: "The Constitution is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor
an Official Secrets Act." 141
2. Access to Governmental Facilities
Two years after Kleindienst, members of the press raised first
amendment challenges to blanket prohibitions of personal interviews between reporters and individually designated inmates in
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 774 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
381 U.S. 1 (1965).
22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976).
8 U.S.C. § 215 (1976).
381 U.S. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Stewart, supra note 61, at 635.
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state and federal prisons.142 Writing for bare majorities in Pell v.
Procunier148 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,144 Justice Stewart
reaffirmed that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press
a constitutional right of special access to information not available
to the public generally." 145 Thus, the Court found it "unnecessary
to engage in any delicate balancing of . . . penal considerations
against the legitimate demands of the First Amendment." 146
Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, argued that the first amendment embodies an affirmative
right to know and confers special privileges on the press so that it
may obtain information and vindicate the public's interests in
popular information. 147 He found the prison regulations on press
interviews to be "far broader than is necessary to protect any legitimate governmental interests and . . . an unconstitutional infringement on the public's right to know protected by the free press
142. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 & n.1 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974).
143. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Pell, reporters contended:
[I]rrespective of what First Amendment liberties may or may not be
retained by prison inmates, members of the press have a constitutional
right to interview any inmate who is willing to speak with them, in
the absence of an individualized determination that the particular
interview might create a clear and present danger to prison security
or to some other substantial interest served by the corrections system.
Id. at 829.
144. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In Saxbe, where the lower courts had held that
the federal prison regulation at issue violated the first amendment rights of the
media, the court of appeals had held that press interviews could be denied
"only where it is the judgment of the administrator directly concerned, based
on either the demonstrated behavior of the inmate, or special conditions existing at the institution at the time the interview is requested, or both, that the
interview presents a serious risk of administrative or disciplinary problems."
Id. at 846, quoting Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1974), rev'd sub non. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
145. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 833, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 684 (1972). For a discussion of Branzburg, see notes 54-65 and
accompanying text supra. The Pell Court elaborated on this statement as
follows:
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of
information not available to members of the general public, that he
is entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of
such sources ....
and that government cannot restrain the publication
of news emanating from such sources ....
It is quite another thing to
suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative
duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally. That proposition finds no
support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this
Court.
417 U.S. at 834-35 (citations omitted).
146. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849.
147. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 889-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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guarantee of the First Amendment." 148 Moreover, Justice Douglas
thought that special privileges for the press to receive information
and acquire access to facilities not open to the public was defensible:
The prohibition of visits by the public has no practical
effect upon their right to know beyond that achieved by
the exclusion of the press. The average citizen is most
unlikely to inform himself about the operation of the
prison system by requesting an interview with a particular
inmate with whom he has no prior relationship. He is
likely instead, in a society which values a free press, to
149
rely upon the media for information.
Justice Powell also dissented in Pell and Saxbe, finding that an
absolute prohibition on prisoner-press interviews "significantly impairs the right of the people to a free flow of information and ideas
on the conduct of their Government .

.

.

."

10

He further ex-

plained that "the underlying right is the right of the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's
interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the
public's right." 151 Justice Powell, however, emphasized that
"[g]overnmental regulations should not be policed in the name of a
'right to know' unless they significantly affect the societal function
of the First Amendment." 152 He then indicated that he would
uphold press interview policies that accommodate both first amendment and governmental interests and cautioned against excessive
claims to a right to know: "Common sense and proper respect for
the constitutional commitment of the affairs of state to the Legislative and Executive Branches should deter the Judiciary from chasing the right-of-access rainbows that an advocate's eye can spot in
virtually all governmental actions." 153
The Pell and Saxbe cases demonstrate the appeal of the political
ideal of an informed public and highlight the divisions of the Court
over interpreting that ideal and the first amendment. Those divisions emerged again four years later when a plurality again rejected
claims by the media for access to prison facilities in Houchins v.
KQED.1 54 KQED, a California broadcasting station, challenged as
148. Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 872 (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 872 (Powell, J., dissenting).

153. Id.
pate.

154. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
Id. at 16.

Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not partici-
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a denial of first amendment rights the refusal of Alameda County
Jail officials to permit access to a portion of the jail where a
prisoner's suicide had occurred, reportedly due to the conditions
of the prison. 15 Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion joined by
Justices White and Rehnquist, examined prior rulings in rejecting
any claim that the press is entitled to special privileges because of
the importance of an informed public and the role which the press
plays in providing such information. 15 He emphasized that "an
analysis of those cases reveals that the Court was concerned with
the fTeedom of the media to communicate information once it is
obtained; [the cases do not intimate] that the Constitution compels
the government to provide the media with information or access to
it on demand." 157 He then concluded:
[KQED's] argument is flawed, not only because it
lacks precedential support and is contrary to statements in
this Court's opinions, but also because it invites the Court
to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which
the Constitution has left to the political processes. Whether
the government should open penal institutions in the
manner sought by [KQED] is a question of policy which a
legislative body might appropriately resolve one way or
the other.158
The plurality opinion thus accepts at face value the Court's
opinions in Pell and Saxbe which denied special rights of access to
the press. 1 59 Their author, Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment in Houchins, agreed that "[t]he First
and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right
of access to information generated or controlled by government,
nor do they guarantee the press any basic right of access superior
to that of the public generally." 160 After he reviewed the importance of the press to society, however, Justice Stewart concluded
that "terms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual
members of the public may, if they impede effective reporting
without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visitors
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 3-6.
Id. at 8-12.
Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 12.
See notes 142-53 and accompanying text supra.
160. 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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see." 161 In other words, although neither press nor public has a
first amendment right of access to prisons, once that access is granted
to the public generally, the press may be able to gain access on
more favorable terms so as to report adequately upon the conditions
62
in the accessible areas.'
Justice Stevens, however, having assumed Justice Douglas' seat
on the high court, maintained his predecessor's position expressed
in Pell and Saxbe.1 63 In Houchins, Justice Stevens wrote the dis64
senting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Powell joined.
In their view, the basic question was "whether [the jail's] policies,
which cut off the flow of information at its source, abridged the
public's right to be informed about [the jail's] conditions." 165
Justice Stevens argued that "[w]ithout some protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions
.

.

.

by the public at large, the process of self-governance contem-

plated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance." 166
Thus, the division within the Burger Court between the Chief
Justice and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, White and Stewart, on
the one hand, and Justices Stevens, Powell, Brennan, and Marshall
on the other, arises because of the latter Justices' willingness to
allow special privileges for the press in order that the press may
inform the public of vital issues and current events. The latter,
unlike the former, are further willing to fashion a limited but enforceable right to know by extending dicta on first amendment
protection for the right to receive 167 and the import of free and
unrestricted dissemination of information within the body politic.' s
They also are willing to assume the task of line-drawing in determining the reasonableness of policies restricting public access to
governmental facilities or materials and deciding what the public
has or has not a right to know. 69 In other words, the justices remain fundamentally divided over the political ideal of an informed
public and what the first amendment requires and permits. Whereas
Justice Stevens' group finds a limited but enforceable right to know
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See id. at 17-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See notes 147-49 and accompanying text supra.
438 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See notes 114-23 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.

169. Compare Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. at 3-16 with text accompanying

note 33 supra.
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constitutionally defensible, the Chief Justice and his colleagues find
such an affirmative right illegitimate, both in terms of historical
perspective and recent rulings on the first amendment; as well as
pernicious in expanding the Court's supervisory role and entan170
gling it in policy issues.
The Court has never recognized any right of access to governmental facilities, whether in the public generally or the press.
A majority has denied such rights exist, although one member of
that majority appeared willing to grant the press special terms of
access to those facilities, and those justices arguing for an enforceable right of access in the public and the press remain a minority.
3. Popular Information and Public Trials
Controversy over a first amendment right of access to trials is
particularly salient because of the symbolic appeal of a public's
right to know. Justice Stewart himself, the author of Pell and
Saxbe, earlier wrote in his dissent in Estes v. Texas 171 that "[t]he
suggestion that there are limits upon the public's right to know
what goes on in courts causes me deep concern." 172 In fact, even
the opinion for the Court in Estes, holding that television broadcasting of criminal trials may amount to a violation of due process,' 73 declared that "the public has a right to be informed as to
what occurs in its courts." 174 The following year, in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 17 the Court further observed: "The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 176
170. See O'Brien, supra note 31, at 608-17.
171. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
172. Id. at 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 534-35; id. at 552 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 587 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Cf. id. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the case
only determined the issue with regard to trials of great notoriety, since the
opinion of Justice Harlan, who constituted the fifth vote of the bare majority,
was so qualified).

The opinions of the Justices constituting the majority turned

almost exclusively on the danger of prejudice to the defendant inherent in
televising such trials. See id. at 544-50. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, recently held that photographic or broadcast coverage of criminal trials
is not inherently a denial of due process. Chandler v. Florida, 49 U.S.L.W.
4141, 4145 (Jan. 26, 1981).
174. Id. at 541.

175. 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that the "massive, pervasive, and prejudicial" publicity attending a murder trial constituted a denial of the convicted
person's right to a fair trial warranting the grant of a writ of habeas corpus).
176. Id. at 350.
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The Burger Court continues to recognize these important and
interdependent interests. Indeed, the Burger Court has repeatedly
demonstrated sensitivity to the public's understanding of and the
necessity for open trials. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,'7
for example, the Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, reaffirmed that "prior restraints on speech and publications are the
most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." 178 Here, Chief Justice Burger endorsed previous holdings
that public and press access to trials serves the important and interdependent interests of an informed public and defendants' right to
179
a fair trial.
The "fair trial/free press controversy" 180 arising with sensational trials necessitates balancing the interests of the defendant
with the public's interests in obtaining information.' 8' The dilemma
of reconciling the sixth amendment and the first amendment may
be at least partially circumvented, as Chief Justice Burger urged in
Nebraska Press Association, by judges employing alternatives to
prior restraints on publication in those circumstances where pretrial
publicity would deny defendants a fair trial. 1 2 Moreover, as Justice
Harlan argued in his concurring opinion in Estes, "the right of a
'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging
to the accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which
justice is administered." 183 This view was eloquently expressed by
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who explained:
177. 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding that an order restraining a newspaper
from publishing accounts of confessions or admissions discussed in open court
during arraignment, or other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused, violated the first amendment).
178. Id. at 559.

179. See id. at 559-60.
180. See Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal Trials, 10 H~atv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 608 (1975); Note, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Balancing
Freedom of the Press Against the Right to a Fair Trial, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV.
763 (1977).
181. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562. In the opinion
of the Court, Chief Justice Burger employed Judge Learned Hand's test:
Whether "the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id., quoting
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), a/'d, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
182. See 427 U.S. at 563-65. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at
357-62. The measures mentioned included: 1) change of venue to a place
exposed to less publicity; 2) postponement of trial; 3) "searching questioning"
of prospective jurors; and 4) "emphatic and clear instructions" on the duty of
the jurors to decide the case in accord with the evidence presented in court.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-64.
183. 381 U.S. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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A trial is not a "free trade in ideas," nor is the best
test of truth in a courtroom "the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market." . . .
A court is a forum with strictly defined limits for discussion. It is circumscribed in the range of its inquiry
and in its methods by the Constitution, by laws, and by
age-old traditions.
Of course freedom of speech and press are essential to
the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those
who wield power. Particularly should this freedom be
employed in comment upon the work of courts, who are
without many influences ordinarily making for humor and
humility, twin antidotes to the corrosion of power. But
the Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom of expression can hardly carry implications that nullify the
guarantee of impartial trials.8 4
The antagonism over translating first amendment guarantees
into affirmative rights for the public and the press against the
government intensified with the ruling in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 85 In Gannett, a newspaper asked the Court to recognize
an independent and affirmative right of access for reporters to pretrial proceedings under the first, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. 18 At a pretrial hearing on the suppression of allegedly
involuntary confessions and certain physical evidence, the defendants had requested that the public and the press be excluded on
the grounds that adverse pretrial publicity would jeopardize their
ability to receive a fair trial. 87 The district attorney did not oppose the motion for closure; nor did a reporter, who was employed
by Gannett Publishing Company and present at the hearing, offer
any objection.18 8 The trial judge granted the motion. 8 9 The following day, the reporter requested a copy of the pretrial transcript
and asserted a right to cover the proceeding, which the trial judge
denied. 9 0 Gannett Publishing Company then sought a writ of
184. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court's holding that contempt convictions of persons who published comment on a trial before all matters had been finally
determined violated the first amendment).
185. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 374-78.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 375-76.
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mandamus arguing that the sixth amendment conferred a right of
access on the public and the press to attend pretrial hearings as well
as trials, 191 and, on appeal, urging the Supreme Court to narrow its
holdings in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins to the extent of recognizing,
under the first and fourteenth amendments, an independent and
affirmative right of the public and the press to attend pretrial
19 2
hearings.
The Supreme Court was divided over the issues in Gannett
and the majority opinion was so broadly framed that it not only
invited criticisms from the Court's commentators, but also
prompted no fewer than five of the Justices to clarify, explain and
defend extrajudicially the holding and import of the case. 93 As in
Pell and Saxbe,194 Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for a fivemember majority. 9 5
Turning first to the sixth amendment claim, Justice Stewart
observed that "[t]he Constitution nowhere mentions any right of
access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its guarantee, like
the others enumerated, is personal to the accused." 196 He then
formulated the issue posed in Gannett as "whether members of the
public have an enforceable right to a public trial that can be asserted independently of the parties in the litigation."

197

Although

Justice Stewart acknowledged that "there is a strong societal interest in public trials," he went on to note that "[r]ecognition of an
191. See id. at 384. The sixth amendment reads, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
192. See 443 U.S. at 391.
193. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 43; Brennan Assails Media Criticisms of
Court Decisions, Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1979, §A, at 12, col. 1; Justice
Marshall Hits Colleagues on Rights, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 3, 1979,
§ B, at 2, col. 1; New York Times, Sept. 9, 1979, § A, at 14, col. 1 (quoting
Justice Stevens' view that "members of the general public, including the press,
could not assert rights guaranteed to the accused by the Sixth Amendment");
New York Times, Aug. 14, 1979, § A, at 13, col. I (reporting Justice Powell's
address to a panel at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association and
explanation that Gannett was based only on the sixth amendment; New York
Times, Sept. 4, 1979, § A, at 15, col. 1 (reporting Justice Blackmun's view that,
after Gannett, closure of trials is permissible).
194. See notes 142-53 and accompanying text supra.
195. 443 U.S. at 370. Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Id. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist also filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at
394 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 403
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote a lengthy dissent, joined
by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 379-80.
197. Id. at 382-83.
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independent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment guarantees is a far cry ...from the creation of a constitutional
right on the part of the public." 198 Any public interest involved,
moreover, is "protected by the participants in the litigation." 199
The Court also rejected the argument that the sixth amendment
embodied an historical "common-law right of the public to attend
criminal trials," 200 but seemingly qualified this statement as follows:
But even if the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
could properly be viewed as embodying the common-law
right of the public to attend criminal trials, it would not
necessarily follow that the petitioner would have a right of
access under the circumstances of this case. For there
exists no persuasive evidence that at common law members of the public had any right to attend pre-trial proceedings .... 201
Moving then to the first amendment claim to a right of access,
Justice Stewart's opinion equivocated:
We need not decide in the abstract, however, whether
there is any such constitutional right. For even assuming,
arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments may
guarantee such access in some situations, a question we do
not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate
deference by the state nisi prius court in the present
2 02

case.

Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion in order to
point out that the case dealt only with pretrial hearings and to
clarify the nature of such proceedings and their contemporary importance in view of the exclusionary rule and the resulting multitude of motions to suppress evidence.2 03 The Chief Justice, thus,
reserved comment on whether the press and the public have a right
24
under the sixth amendment to attend actual trials themselves.
198. Id. at 383.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 387.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 392 (emphasis by the Court). In concluding that no right of
access, even if it were found to exist, had been violated, the Court noted that:
I) no members of the public, including the reporter in Gannett, had objected
when the motion was made; 2) the judge had subsequently granted the reporter
an opportunity to be heard on reopening; 3) the judge concluded that the
possibility of prejudice to the defendant outweighed any first amendment
interests; and 4) any denial of access was temporary, since the transcript was
later made available. Id. at 392-93.
203. Id. at 394-96 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
204. Id. at 397 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Although Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court on
the sixth amendment issue, his concurring opinion addressed the
first amendment issues that Justice Stewart had reserved. 20 5 Justice
Powell underscored "the importance of the public's having accurate
information concerning the operation of its criminal justice system,"
and, therefore, would have held "explicitly that petitioner's reporter
had an interest protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 206 However, the Justice, remaining consistent with his
concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes,

°7

thought that the Court

should reach an accommodation between the first amendment rights
of the public and the press and those of the criminal defendant. 208
Here, the public's right of access, he noted, was "limited both by
the constitutional right of the defendants to a fair trial . . .and by

the needs of government to obtain just convictions and to preserve
the confidentiality of sensitive information and the identity of informants." 209 Justice Powell, therefore, remains willing to legitimate a right to know as a limited but enforceable right in some
circumstances. Indeed, what particularly disturbed him in Gannett
was that the majority failed to articulate a procedure or standard
by which lower courts might balance first amendment rights of the
public and the press against the interests of the government and the
defendants' sixth amendment rights. 2

10

Justice Powell abandoned

in Gannett those justices with whom he had dissented in Pell, Saxbe,
and Houchins,2 1 in finding that the actions of the trial judge in
balancing first amendment interests of the public against those of
the government and the defendants were acceptable. 212
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion to stress that
"the public does not have any Sixth Amendment right of access to
such proceedings," 213 and to address Justice Powell's understanding
of the first amendment.2 14 He cautioned that the Court's reservation on the first amendment claims to access was more apparent
than real: "[I]t is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that
205. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
206. Id.
207. See 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Branzburg,see notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra.
208. 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
211. See notes 143-66 and accompanying text supra.
212. 443 U.S. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
214. Id. at 404.
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there is no First Amendment right of access in the public or the
press to judicial or other governmental proceedings." 215 Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence was thus prompted by Justice Stewart's
reservations on the first amendment claims in the opinion for the
Court, which had, in turn, probably been required to win the votes
of Justices Stevens and Powell. These latter votes were necessary
since Justice Blackmun and Justice White dissented in Gannett on
the basis that the sixth amendment supported the newspaper's
claim. 216 Justice Rehnquist further reminds us of Justice Stewart's
opposition to denominating any affirmative rights for the public
and the press under the first amendment by quoting from his concurring opinion in Houchins: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information
generated or controlled by the government, nor do they guarantee
the press any basic right of access superior to that of the public
generally." 217 Justice Rehnquist concluded that "this Court has
emphatically rejected the proposition that . .

.

the First Amend-

ment [is] some sort of constitutional 'sunshine law' that requires
notice, an opportunity to be heard and subsequent reasons before
a government proceeding may be closed to the public and the
press." 218
Justice Blackmun's dissent quarrels only with the majority's
understanding of the sixth amendment guarantee for a public trial.
He concludes that the amendment by "establishing the public's
right of access to a criminal trial and a pretrial proceeding, also
fixes the rights of the press." 219 With respect to the first amendment claims, Justice Blackmun commented only that "[t]o the extent the Constitution protects a right of public access to the proceeding, the standards enunciated under the Sixth Amendment
suffice to protect that right." 220 He therefore concluded that he
did not need to reach the first amendment claims. 221 It is worthy
of note, however, that he had remarked earlier in the opinion that
"[d]espite Mr. Justice Powell's concern .

. . .,

this Court heretofore

has not found and does not today find, any First Amendment right
215. Id. (citations omitted).

216. See notes 219-21 and accompanying text infra.
217. 443 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), quoting Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
218. 443 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
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of access to judicial or other governmental proceedings." 222 That
the dissenters also declined to address the first amendment issue is
understandable because of the fact that Justices White and Blackmun had previously voted against finding rights of access in Pell
and Saxbe.228 On the other hand, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
staunch defenders of the right to know, had, predictably, expressed
224
their support for rights of access in Pell and Sax be.

Gannett suggested that the Supreme Court would still refuse to
construct a first amendment right of access to governmental institutions for the public and the press. Nevertheless, the opinion raised
more questions than it answered. In discussing the lower courts'
treatment of first amendment interests of the press under a hypothetical right of access, 22 5 the opinion of the Court severely under-

cut the effect of its statement that the Court had never recognized
such a right of access.2 28 Moreover, because of the Court's hypothetical treatment of the right of access, lower courts construing the
opinion as suggesting that such a right exists are left without a
standard by which to apply it.227
Sensitive both to the problematic nature and impact of Gannett
the Court agreed to hear a challenge to the closure of a trial in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.22s

The case originated

several years earlier, prior to the decision in Gannett, but involved
the first constitutional challenge to the closure of a criminal trial.
Under Virginia law, judges may exercise their discretion in closing
a criminal trial or excluding "from the trial any person whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the
right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated." 229
222. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

223. See notes 143-46 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 147-48 and accompanying text supra.
225. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
226. See 443 U.S. at 391.
227. In the 52 weeks following the Gannett decision, there were 272 attempts to close criminal proceedings and closure resulted in 122 pretrial hearings and 33 trials. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Court

Watch Summary, Aug. 18, 1980. See also Lusky, Public Trial and Public
Right: The Missing Bottom Line, 8 HOrSTRA L. REV. 273 (1980).
228. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). For a detailed analysis of the Richmond
Newspapers decision, see Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-The
Public and Press Have a Right of Access to Criminal Trials Absent an Overriding Interest Articulated in Findings, 26 VILL. L. Rxv. 183 (1981).
229. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975). This section provides in pertinent part:

In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial
any person whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial,
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The particular circumstances of the Richmond Newspapers
case are illustrative of the problems of securing a fair trial and
achieving a balance between prejudicial publicity and the public's
right to know. Here, the closure was requested by defense counsel
in the fourth trial of John Paul Stevenson for the stabbing murder
of a hotel manager in 1975.230 In 1976, Stevenson was promptly
tried and convicted of second degree murder in the Circuit Court
of Hanover County, Virginia.231 A year later, however, the Virginia
State Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that a bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had been improperly admitted as evidence at his trial. 232 Retried the following
year, his second trial in the same court ended in a mistrial when
one of the jurors asked to be excused after the trial had begun and
there was no available alternate juror.233 The third trial, in 1978,
also ended in a mistrial because a prospective juror had read about
Stevenson's previous trials and told the other jurors about the case
before the retrial had even begun. 23 4 At the outset of Stevenson's
fourth trial his attorneys requested, and the prosecution did not
object to, a closed trial on the grounds that they did not "want any
information being shuffled back and forth when we have a recess as
to what-who testified to what." 25 On the bench barely a year
and having presided over two of the earlier mistrials, Judge Richard
Taylor agreed to closure and rebuffed the arguments of two reporters from Richmond Newspapers who were excluded from the
trial.236 Judge Taylor found his authority to close the trial in the
Virginia statute and justified by the prior mistrials and the particularly small courtroom.23 7 The ironies abound in this rather
routine murder trial which gave rise to the Supreme Court's watershed decision. Judge Taylor's unprecedented closure of the trial
occurred in a 200-year-old courthouse where Patrick Henry once
provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be
violated.
Id.

230. 100 S. Ct. at 2818-19.
231. Id. at 2818.
232. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 466, 237 S.E.2d 779, 782
(1977).
233. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
234. Id.

235. Id. at 2819, quoting Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Motion to
Close Trial to the Public at 2-3.
236. 100 S. Ct. at 2819, citing Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close Trial to the Public at 4.
237. 100 S. Ct. at 2819, citing Trans. of Sept. 11, 1978, Hearing on De-

fendant's Motion to Close Trial to the Public at 4-5, 19.
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orated.238 The closed trial which prompted Richmond Newspapers' appeal to the Supreme Court had not even attracted the
29
attention of the local weekly newspaper in Hanover County.
Finally, Stevenson was found not guilty, but not as the consequence
of the jury's verdict. Instead, Judge Taylor granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial and entered a verdict of acquittal, since the
case against Stevenson, without the evidence of the bloodstained
shirt, was only circumstantial. 240 Still, the details of both the evidence against Stevenson and the basis for his acquittal remain obscure because the trial was closed and the trial recording is largely
241
inaudible.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Harvard Law Professor
Laurence Tribe argued for the appellants that the first and sixth
amendments independently and interdependently guarantee a constitutional right to attend trials.24 2 The first amendment secures a
right of access, he argued, because trial secrecy deprives citizens of
information vital to effective self-government; whereas the sixth
amendment establishes a norm of openness and gives the public
standing to challenge closure of trials, since, until the instant cases,
trials were traditionally open to the public and the press. 24 8 A right
of access, Tribe further argued, was implicit in the "interdependence" of the first and sixth amendments:
The First Amendment . . . opens a constitutional
window into a proceeding already identified by the Sixth
Amendment as beyond such control-assuring that, even
with the connivances of the accused, the state may not bar
members of the public and press from a criminal trial
without compelling justification. . . . The proceedings
of criminal trials are the quintessential subjects of First
Amendment protection against government interference
with public access: public by tradition, public by function,
and public as a matter of constitutional text and struc24 4

ture.

238. Brief for Appellants at 71, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,

100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
239. See Baker & Barbash, Criminal Trials 'Must Be Open,' Washington
Post, July 3, 1980, §A, at 11, col. 5.

240. Brief for Appellants at 8, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
241. Id. at 42 n.37.
242. Id. at 5-10, 30-41.

243. Id. at 44.
244. Id. at 36.
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Rather than simply imploring the Court to reconsider the line
of cases running from Pell to Gannett, Tribe distinguished those
cases on the ground that access had been demanded and denied to
places not traditionally or constitutionally recognized as public
places or proceedings. Thus he argued that, while Branzburg had
noted that the public and press have no constitutional right of access to "grand jury proceedings, [the Supreme Court's] conferences,
the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session,
and the meetings of private organizations," 245 the Court's prior
rulings never implied that the public and press246 may be excluded
from historically public places and proceedings.
Relying on Gannett, Virginia Attorney General Marshall Coleman defended closure of the trial, arguing that neither the sixth
amendment nor customary and common law practices establish a
constitutional right of public access to criminal trials.2 47 Considering the first amendment claims, he quite properly observed that
"[t]he common thread of this Court's First Amendment decisions is
the notion that freedom to disseminate ideas and information about
public affairs is central to the purpose of the First Amendment." 24s
He further conceded that "[t]he free flow of information concerning
our courts of justice is undoubtedly a vital concern in our system
of democratic self-governance." 249 "But it is a wholly different
proposition," Coleman insisted, "to suggest that the First Amendment guarantees access to all sources of information that may be
beneficial to informed public opinion." 250
No majority supported a single opinion in Richmond Newspapers, but a majority of the justices did embrace Tribe's argument
that the public and press are constitutionally entitled to attend
criminal trials because trials, both traditionally and under the
Constitution, constitute a "public forum." 251 For over forty years,
when elaborating a functional analysis of the first amendment, the
Court has acknowledged protection for public forums as essential
to the public's interests in freedom of information and each indi245. Id. at 31, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 684.
246. Brief for Appellants at 31, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
247. Brief for Appellees at 20-22, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
248. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id.
251. 100 S. Ct. at 2829. The Court did not decide, however, whether the
public has a right to attend trials of civil cases, but noted that "historically
both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." Id. at 2829 n.17.
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vidual's right to speak, distribute publications or assemble in public
places. 252 Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion,
joined only by Justices White and Stevens, found the right of the
public to attend trials in the intersection of the first and sixth
amendments. 253

Justice Stewart used the same rationale in an at-

tempt to distinguish his opinion for the Court in Gannett from the
instant case; 254 whereas Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Marshall, elaborated a more extensive theory of
first amendment protection. 255 Justices Stevens, White and Blackmun also added brief concurrences celebrating the Court's decision;
in Justice Blackmun's words, because it was "gratifying . . . to see

the Court wash away at least some of the graffiti that marred the
prevailing opinions in Gannett." 256 The sole dissenter, Justice
Rehnquist, lamented the Court's activism.

25 7

Chief Justice Burger began by clarifying that Gannett applied
only to pretrial hearings, dismissing Justice Stewart's contrary intimations in that case as dicta.258 Affirming that the issue of public
access to trials had not been previously decided, he turned to the
history of the sixth amendment, surveying the "prophylactic purpose" and "therapeutic value" of open trials.2 59 Reiterating that
openness serves to assure fair proceedings and "satisfies the appearance of justice," 260 he recited prior rulings that the sixth amendment's provision for public trials guarantees only the right of
defendants. 261 However, the Chief Justice interpreted the "presumption of openness" in the sixth amendment as connoting that
252. Id. at 2828, citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 500-18 (1939)

(Roberts, J., concurring).
253. 100 S. Ct. at 2829.
254. Id. at 2839-41 (Stewart, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 2832-39 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concluded
his concurrence by stating that
our ingrained tradition of public trials and the importance of public
access to the broader purposes of the trial process, tip the balance
strongly toward the rule that trials be open. What countervailing
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption
of openness need not concern us now, for the statute at stake here
authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judge and
parties.
Id. at 2839 (footnotes omitted).
256. 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 2842-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 2821.
259. Id. at 2821-26.
260. Id. at 2825, quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
261. Id. at 2821. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
See also notes 185-227 and accompanying text supra.
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the "people retained a 'right of visitation' which enabled them to
satisfy themselves that justice was in fact being done." 262 Turning,
then, to the first amendment, Chief Justice Burger reasserted the
Court's broad functional analysis of freedoms of speech, press and
assembly: first amendment freedoms "share a common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government." 263 Central to the first amendment's
protection of freedom of information, he added, is the concept of a
public forum or arena in which individuals may collectively and
freely discuss matters of personal and public interest.264 The Chief
Justice thus found criminal trials analogous to other public forums
to which members of the public and press have historically enjoyed
access, and distinguishable from places not generally recognized as
open to the public-such as prisons, jails and military bases. 26 5
Significantly, Chief Justice Burger's opinion did not turn on
a reconsideration of the Court's previous rulings in Pell, Saxbe,
Houchins and Gannett, which had denied the constitutional basis
of such first amendment affirmative rights. Instead, the Chief Justice
expanded the concept of a public forum to include trials and thereby
recognized the public's right to attend criminal trials as protected
by the first amendment. Hence, he did not denominate a first
amendment affirmative right of access per se, but rather found the
enforceability of such first amendment claims to be contingent upon
the place or forum to which access is demanded.26 6 Underscoring
262. 100 S. Ct. at 2825.
263. Id. at 2827.
264. Id. at 2828. The Chief Justice stated that "[f]rom the outset, the
right of assembly was regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with
which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen." Id., citing Dejonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
265. Id. at 2827 n.11, citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military
bases); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (prisons); Adderly
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jails).
266. 100 S. Ct. at 2827-28. In so doing, the Chief Justice reiterated that
the access guaranteed by the Court's decision was not a constitutional "right"
in and of itself, but rather was a corollary of and necessary for the effective
enforcement of, the explicitly enumerated rights to speak and to publish. Id.
at 2827. The Court stated:
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials
to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a
"right of access," . . . or a "right to gather information," for we have
recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press would be eviscerated." . . . The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at
a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could,
as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). See notes 123-32 and accompanying text
supra.
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this point in expressly denying that the public possesses an absolute,
unconditional right to open trials, the Chief Justice emphasized
that "[j]ust as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interests of
such objectives as the free flow of traffic . . . so may a trial judge,

in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial." 267 Public forums, of course,
differ as much as city streets and criminal trials differ and, therefore, the restrictions imposed on the public and press may vary from
one forum to another. Chief Justice Burger recognized that public
access to a trial may be limited since judges must control the
decorum of court rooms, but that "the question in a particular case
is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly
abridge . . . the opportunities for the communication of thought

and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places." 268 The problem in the instant case, in the
majority's view, was that the record disclosed no attempt on the part
of the trial court to use alternative measures to protect the defendant, balance the needs of the defendant against those of the public,
or clearly articulate the basis upon which it determined the closure
269

order to be necessary.

Justice White, in his concurrence, correctly pointed out that
"[t]his case would have been unnecessary had Gannett . . . construed the sixth amendment to forbid excluding the public from
criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances." 270
Similarly, Justice Blackmun remained convinced that the decision
could have simply rested on the sixth amendment without invoking
a "veritable potpourri" of amendments. 27 1 Their broad construction of the sixth amendment in Gannett, however, was not acceptable to a majority of the Court. Chief Justice Burger's opinion,
267. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18 (citation omitted).
268. Id., quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
269. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 c n.18.

270. Id. at 2830 (White, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun reiterated
his view, expressed in Gannett, that the sixth amendment affords the public,
not merely the defendant, a right to an open trial. Id. Justice Blackmun
also explained his partial dissent in Gannett, stating that

the public has an intense need and a deserved right to know about the
administration of justice in general; about the prosecution of local
crimes in particular; about the conduct of the judge, the prosecutor,
defense counsel, police officers, other public servants, and all the actors
in the judicial arena; and about the trial itself.
Id., citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 413 & n.2, 414, 428-29

(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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therefore, turned crucially on the juxtaposition of the first and sixth
amendments in order to extend the concept of public forums to
criminal trials and also to preclude further claims of access to pretrial hearings or other governmental facilities and proceedings not
traditionally open to the public.272 In his concurrence Justice
Stevens mistakenly found it "somewhat ironic that the Court should
find more reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in
Houchins." 278 But for the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun and Stewart there was no irony at all since the touchstone for
the Court's narrow holding was that the first and sixth amendments
run together in safeguarding access by members of the public and
press to criminal trials.
The irony for Justice Stevens arises from his willingness to
make exceptions to the general rule that the first amendment protects only freedom from restraints on the dissemination of information. Dissenting in Houchins, Justice Stevens, like Justices Powell,
Brennan and Marshall, remained prepared to recognize affirmative
first amendment claims to access. 274 Here, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, wrote a concurring opinion in order to emphasize their divergence from the majority's interpretation of the first
amendment.275 Whereas the Chief Justice endeavored to narrowly
define the Court's decision, Justice Brennan gave a broader jurisprudential basis for Richmond Newspapers, stressing that "the Court
has not ruled out a public access component to the first amendment
in every circumstance." 276 "Read with care and in context," he
argued, "our decisions must therefore be understood as holding only
that any privilege of access to governmental information is subject
to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information
and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality." 277 Justice
Brennan further explained that, in his view, the Court's functional
analysis of the first amendment was tantamount to a structuralist
interpretation. 278 The first amendment, he argued, "embodies more
than a commitment to free expression and communicative inter272. See notes 260-69 and accompanying text supra.
273. 100 S. Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
274. See notes 163-66 and accompanying text supra.
275. Id. at 2832-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 2832-33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring), citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. at 8-9 (access to prisons); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at
849 (prisons); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831-32 (prisons); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. at 541-42 (television in courtroom); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16-17
(validation of passport to unfriendly country).
278. 100 S. Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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change for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government." 279 Far
from being a mere corollary to, or tool for the implementation of,
the enumerated rights, maintained Justice Brennan, "[this] structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the indispensible conditions of meaningful communication." 280 Hence, unlike
the majority of the Burger Court, Justice Brennan would expressly
denominate first amendment affirmative rights and the constitutional
legitimacy of a directly enforceable public right to know, 28 ' albeit
one which must be "invoked with discrimination and temperance
" 282

In his lone dissent, Justice Rehnquist stood by his absolutist
position in Gannett 283 and argued further that the Court was improperly attempting to extend its supervisory power over the state
2 84

court systems.

A majority of the Supreme Court has not recognized affirmative
first amendment rights for the public and the press to receive or
obtain access to governmental information. 2 5 Contemporary criticisms of the Burger Court's approach to first amendment issues 286
demonstrate a profound misunderstanding of both the Warren and
Burger Courts' treatment of the first amendment. The criticisms
do illuminate once again the wide symbolic appeal for the public
and the press of the first amendment and the political ideal of free279. Id. (emphasis in original).
280. Id.
281. See Brennan, supra note 107; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965).
282. 100 S. Ct. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
283. See notes 213-18 and accompanying text supra.
284. 100 S. Ct. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
observed that:
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound to be a
matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens. But to gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past generation, all of
the ultimate decisionmaking power over how justice shall be administered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the fifty states,
is a task that no Court consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is
equal to.
Id.
285. But see Goodale, The Three-Part Open Door Test in Richmond
Newspapers Case, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1980, at 26-27. See also Goodale, Gannett
Is Burned By Richmond's First Amendment "Sunshine Act," Nat'l L.J., Sept.
29, 1980, at 24.
286. See notes 16-24 supra and authorities cited therein.
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dom of information. That ideal, however, remains misunderstood
by members of the public, the press, and the Court itself. Furthermore, Emerson's argument that contemporary constitutional developments exemplify an emerging first amendment right to know 287
appears, at the least, overdrawn. The Court's treatment of claims
to a right to receive and a right of access neither expressly nor
impliedly supports the constitutional legitimacy of an independent
and affirmative right to know. For, although it is true that majorities of the Supreme Court have consistently recognized that the
first amendment's specific guarantees serve an important function in
guaranteeing popular and accessible information about vital public
affairs, and thereby serve to inform the public, the first amendment
does not mandate an affirmative right to obtain information from
governmental facilities and materials. In a constitutional perspective, as a majority of the Supreme Court has recognized, 288 the issue
of access to governmental information is reserved for the legislative
and executive branches.
C. The Doctrine of No Prior Restraints and the Right to Know
A further measure of the significance of the political ideal of
freedom of information and an informed public is the commitment
to the policy against prior restraints, borne out in the controversies
over the "Pentagon Papers"289 and Progressive290 cases. By construing the elimination of prior restraints on publications as the
"leading purpose" of the first amendment, 29' the Supreme Court
articulated a presumption of the unconstitutionality of prior restraints, thereby ensuring the primary bulwark for the political ideal
of an informed public.2 92 In one of the Court's earliest rulings on
the first amendment, Justice Holmes observed: "[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous
287. See notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
288. See notes 43 & 153 and accompanying text supra. See also text

accompanying note 349 infra.

289. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

321-60 and accompanying text infra.

See notes

290. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.

1979). See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra; notes 350-57 and accompanying text infra.
291. Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (holding uncon-

stitutional a municipal ordinance forbidding distribution of any kind of literature without a permit).
292. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 249 (1936) (invalidating a state tax on gross advertising receipts of publications with over 20,000
subscribers as a violation of the first amendment).
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restraintsupon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such
as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." 298 Thus, prior
restraints are subject to exacting judicial scrutiny because, as Justice
Blackmun explained, "a free society prefers to punish the few who
abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them
and all others beforehand." 294
Yet despite the strong policy against prior restraints, vexatious
problems occasionally arise concerning the scope of the amendment's
protection. The Pentagon Papers295 and Progressive cases exemplify the difficulty of the policy against prior restraint and its
bearing on the scope of the first amendment and claims to a right
to know. Those cases are especially hard since the information
withheld by the government did not fall within a category of unprotected speech, 296 and because the restraints threatened to diminish the public's first amendment interests in knowing about governmental affairs more directly than restrictions on the time, place and
manner of disseminating information, 29 or acquiring access to
298
governmental facilities.

The constitutional presumption against prior restraints, however, remains rebuttable. Indeed, "[p]rior restraints are not uncon293. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), quoting Common-

wealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825) (emphasis by the court).
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).

For a discussion of the

historical purpose of the first amendment regarding prior restraints, see
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-49 (1936).
294. Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975)
(emphasis in original) (holding unconstitutional the rejection, without adequate

procedural safeguards, of a promoter's application to use a municipal theater
for a production of the musical "Hair").

This principle was elucidated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931):
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant
purveyors of scandal does not make any less necessary the immunity
of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate
remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.
Id. at 720. For a discussion of Near, see notes 303-11 and accompanying text
infra.

295. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See notes 321-41 and accompanying
text infra.

296. See notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.
297. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
298. See notes 142-66 and accompanying text supra.
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stitutional per se." 299 In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,3 °° Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Warren Court, cautioned against concluding that the first amendment prohibition of prior restraint is
absolute:
The phrase "prior restraint" is not a self-wielding
sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test. The duty of
closer analysis and critical judgment in applying the
thought behind the phrase has thus been authoritatively
put by one who brings weighty learning to his support of
constitutionally protected liberties: "What is needed,"
writes Professor Paul A. Freund, "is a pragmatic assessment
of its operation in the particular circumstances. The
generalization that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious
in civil liberties cases must yield to more particularistic
analysis." 801
The Burger Court continues to adhere to such a balancing test
for determining the constitutional permissibility of prior restraints. 3 0 2 As Justice Frankfurter implied, this balancing approach
is possible because the policy against prior restraints admits of
fundamental exceptions that pertain to the content of the information restrained. In Near v. Minnesota,830 the Court's first major
discussion of prior restraints, Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the
majority: "The objection has also been made that the principle as
299. Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
(citation omitted). See note 294 supra.
300. 354 U.S. 436 (1957). At issue was the constitutionality of a New York
statute providing for limited injunctive relief against persons selling or distributing obscene material. Id. at 440. Although the Court acknowledged that
imposition of prior restraints was to be "closely confined," it sustained the
provision, noting with approval the carefully tailored procedural safeguards.
Id.
301. Id. at 441-42, quoting Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,
4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1952).
302. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562. To determine
whether an order restraining publication of accounts of admissions or confessions of the accused in a widely reported murder trial was an invalid infringement upon first amendment rights, the Court in Nebraska Press examined the
following: "(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether
other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial
publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent
the threatened danger." Id. at 562. Accord, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("we have eschewed
absolutes in favor of a more delicate calculus that carefully weighs the conflicting interests to determine which demands greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented").
303. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding unconstitutional the enjoining of publication of a magazine pursuant to a statute permitting injunctions against
publication of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" periodicals).
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to immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every
such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly
true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited." 304 The Chief Justice, thereupon, articulated three exceptions to the policy against prior restraints. First, the government
may, while the nation is at war, permissibly restrict dissemination
of information that might hinder the war effort or the survival of
the polity.30 5 Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that no one would
gainsay that "a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number or location of troops." 300 Accordingly, the first
amendment does not protect individuals who pass classified defense
information to enemy agents.80 7 "On similar grounds," the Chief
Justice also thought that "the primary requirements of decency may
be enforced aganist obscene publications," 308 and that "[t]he security of the community life may be protected against incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." 309 In other words, speech and press that serve "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas" 310 receives no exemption from
regulation under the rule against prior restraint any more than it
receives first amendment protection against subsequent punishment. 311
While the Court's opinion in Near is indeed important in suggesting that obscenity and incitements to violence may be subject
to prior restraints, it is notable that such speech is unprotected anyway. More important for the purposes of this article is the suggestion that matters related to national defense-matters clearly politi304. Id. at 715-16.
305. Id. at 716.
306. Id. (footnote omitted).
307. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 591-92 (2d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1953) ("communication to a foreign government of secret material connected with the national defense can by no farfetched reasoning be included within the area of First Amendment protected
free speech"); United States v. Donas-Botto, 363 F. Supp. 191, 194 (E.D. Mich.
1973) ("when matters of foreign policy are involved the government has the
constitutional authority to prohibit individuals from divulging 'technical data'
related to implements of war to foreign governments").
308. 283 U.S. at 716. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436 (1957); note 300 supra.
309. 283 U.S. at 716. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Driver's Union Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1940) (upholding injunction
against acts of violence of picketing union).
310. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572.
311. See notes 66-86 and accompanying text supra.
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cal and of interest to the public-might also be susceptible to prior
restraints.
The vexatious problems of balancing the first amendment, and
claims to a right to know, against governmental withholding of information relating to national security and the affairs of governance
infrequently rise to the level of constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, Pentagon Papers and Progressive illustrate that there persist
serious constitutional issues as to what the first amendment requires
and permits within the framework of our constitutional system.

On the one hand, both constitutional practice and principle affirm
the necessity of official governmental secrecy in times of war and
international crisis, with regard to technological materials related to
defense strategy and in the conduct of diplomatic and foreign
affairs.3 12 On the other hand, the first amendment guarantees for
speech and press ensure the vital interests of the public in knowing
313
about governmental operations.
Historically, the Supreme Court has often been spared the task
of deciding such hard cases and balancing these competing interests,
perhaps because, in times of crisis, the government has generally
3 15
fostered openness 314 while the press has accepted self-censorship.
Still, reconsideration of the Supreme Court's treatment of the policy
against prior restraints and the dilemma of balancing first amendment claims against national security interests aids in understand312. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (recognizing
a presumptive, qualified privilege for presidential communications generally);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (upholding claim of governmental privilege to withhold military secrets, invoked in discovery in a tort
action arising out of the crash of a military plane testing "secret" electronic
equipment); Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) (refusing to review that part of an administrative order revised by the
President, pursuant to congressional authority, "because of certain factors relating to our broad national welfare" which might be based on secret intelligence). See generally Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1972).
313. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (dictum)
("broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political
system and an open society"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)
(dictum) (noting the "paramount public interest in a free flow of information
to the people concerning public officials").
314. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT & MASS COMMUNICATIONS 455-59
(1947); J. WIcGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 95 (1956); O'Brien, Privacy and the

Right of Access: Purposes and Paradoxes of Information Control, 30 AD. L.
REV. 45, 56-61 (1978).

315. See, e.g., M. STEIN, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 107-08 (1966) (discussing

self-imposed censorship by the press regarding developments in World War II
and the Vietnam War); CENSORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 134-48 (G. McClellan
ed. 1967) (discussing the self-imposed censorship of the press with respect to
"U-2" missions over the Soviet Union and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962).
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ing the contours of the amendment with respect to claims to a
right to know. Indeed, such an understanding is becoming more
important because of the courts' increasingly frequent confrontations with first amendment challenges to government regulations
restricting dissemination of technical information pertaining to
national defense, 16 requiring secrecy agreements of some government employees, 17 and imposing limitations on the political activities of government employees. 18 The Progressivecase illuminated
this conflict and the difficulty of delineating the requirements of the
first amendment and the acceptable limits on the political ideal of
an informed public. 19 Although, in that case, the government
abandoned its efforts to enjoin publication, it did so only because
of the publication of similar material by another source. 20 Furthermore, reflection on Progressive leads to a re-examination of the per2
plexing prior restraint decision in Pentagon Papers. '
Although the Court refused to enjoin publication in Pentagon
Papers,322 the case does not establish a precedent forbidding the
government from enjoining publication of classified or confidential
316. See, e.g., United States v. Edler Indus. Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.
1978) (upholding restrictions on exportation of technical data under the National Security Act of 1954 against first amendment challenge); United States
v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
317. See United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). In
Snepp, the Court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the government on
profits received from publication of a book on the CIA, because it contained
unclassified information published without permission in violation of an express
term of the author's employment contract with the CIA. Id. at 508-09. In
rejecting the author's first amendment claim that the contract was an unenforceable prior restraint on protected speech, the Court noted: "The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information
important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so
essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service." Id. at
509 n.3. See also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368-70 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1999 (1975) (first amendment is no bar to an injunction forbidding disclosure of classifiable information acquired during an employee's term of employment where disclosure is forbidden by agreement);
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313-16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
318. See, e.g, United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (plainly identifiable acts of political campaigning by civil service employees may constitutionally be prohibited); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-103 (1947) (upholding statute forbidding political activity of government employees).
319. For a discussion of Progressive,see notes 10-16 and accompanying text
supra; notes 350-57 and accompanying text infra.
320. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
321, See notes 322-39 c 358-60 and accompanying text infra.
322. 403 U.S. at 714.
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materials. 282 Instead, the majority of the Court indicated acceptance of two fundamental principles. First, five justices acknowledged that the first amendment does not provide absolute protection
for the dissemination of all information. 8 24 Second, a majority of
the members of the Court concluded that the executive branch
possesses no inherent power to impose a prior restraint on publications.8 23 Indeed, only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan were
unwilling to embrace this last proposition.3 2 Justices Brennan and
Blackmun also might be understood to recognize limited inherent
power to withhold information.8 27 Nevertheless, Justices Black, 828
Douglas, 29 White,380 Marshall, 831 and Stewart 882 specifically rejected
the position that the executive branch possessed any such inherent
8 33

power.

Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Pentagon Papers remains the most instructive for illuminating the constitutional issues
raised in that case and Progressive. Justice Marshall found that
Pentagon Papers turned not on the first amendment, but on the
doctrine of separation of powers, since the ultimate issue "is whether
this Court or the Congress has the power to make law." 834 He
began by noting that the President had the power, as authorized
323. Id. at 714; id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart,
J., concurring); id. at 731 (White, J., concurring); id. at 749 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 756-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
324. See 403 U.S. at 714; id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 729-30
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 731 (White, I., concurring); id. at 749 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also notes 299-311
and accompanying text supra.
325. See 403 U.S. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 723-24 (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 732-33 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also notes 350-57 and
accompanying text infra.
326. See 403 U.S. at 750-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 756-58 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
327. See id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (pointing out that "there is
a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban
on prior judicial restraint may be overridden"); id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hat is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow
right of the Government to prevent").
328. Id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring).
329. Id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 731-33 (White, J., concurring).
331. Id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
333. See note 325 and accompanying text supra.

334. 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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by Congress, to classify documents and information,"'5 and the
power, as chief executive 336 and commander-in-chief,3 3 7 to ensure
the national security and discipline employees who disclose confidential or classified information.33 8 Consequently, the first question in Pentagon Papers is whether the executive branch possessed
authority to invoke the equity powers of the courts to protect what
it perceived to be the interests of national security. 33 9 Here, for
Justice Marshall, the reasoning in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
3 41
Sawyer 8 40 was controlling.
3 42
In Youngstown, the Court struck down an executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of
the nation's steel mills, in spite of the President's belief that a
nationwide steel strike would jeopardize the national defense and
war efforts in Korea.3 43 Although a majority of the Court concluded that the President had no constitutional authority to con344
fiscate the mills in the absence of congressional authorization,
only Justices Black and Douglas specifically found that the President
has no inherent powers.3 45 Justice Marshall nevertheless interpreted their understanding to be determinative of the Court's holding, and elaborated on Justice Black's position in Youngstown that
"[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." 346 Justice
Marshall stated:
335. Id. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp.
II 1978); Exec. Order No. 12065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979) (creating a new executive

classification scheme designed "to balance the public's interest in access to
Government information with the need to protect certain national security

information"); notes 325-27 and accompanying text supra.
336. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. This section provides that the
executive power of the United States is vested in the President. Id.
337. See id. § 2, cl. 1. This clause states, in pertinent part: "The President
shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of
the United States .... ." Id.
338. 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring).
339. Id.
340. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

See note 3 and accompanying text supra.

341. 403 U.S. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).
342. Exec. Order No. 10340, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1949-53 Compilation).

343. 343 U.S. at 583, 589.
344. Id. at 587-88.
345. Compare id. at 585-89 and id. 629-34 (Douglas, J., concurring) with

id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and id. at 639-40 (Jackson, J., concurring).

See also Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without

Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953).
346. 343 U.S. at 585.
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It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the
concept of separation of powers for this Court to use its
power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has
specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar
damage to the basic concept of these co-equal branches of
Government if when the Executive Branch has adequate
authority granted by Congress to protect "national security" it can choose instead to invoke the contempt power
of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the
8 47
President execute laws, and courts interpret laws.
Accordingly, Justice Marshall concluded that the Supreme Court
may not legitimately enforce prior restraints on the dissemination
of information in the absence of specific authorization by Con-

gress.3 48

He concluded: "It is not for this Court to fling itself into

every breach perceived by some Government official nor is it for
this Court to take on itself the burden of enacting law, especially a
law that Congress has refused to pass." 349
In both the Pentagon Papers and Progressive cases, the government improperly claimed an inherent power to restrain the publication of materials.8 50 But Pentagon Papers and Progressive are
nonetheless distinguishable in one significant respect: in the latter
case the government sought the injunction pursuant to the specific
authorization of Congress in the Atomic Energy Act regarding the
publication of technical information concerning the construction of
thermonuclear weapons.351 Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the fundamental issue in Progressive was whether the government may permissibly rely on the courts to enjoin publication of
materials that Congress specifically defines as "restricted data" and
authorizes the government to seek, and the courts to provide, injunctions against the dissemination of that information. 5 2
Justice Marshall prophetically addressed that issue in Pentagon
Papers when he emphasized that the executive branch had improperly sought an injunction against publication of materials that
Congress had not expressly restricted by statute or empowered the
347. 403 U.S. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
348. Id. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring).
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Government at 26, 107-14, United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).

351. See 467 F. Supp. at 994. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1976 & Supp.

II 1978).
352. See 467 F. Supp. at 994.
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government and the courts to enjoin.3 53 Justice Marshall also noted
that the executive branch and the judiciary may constitutionally
restrain publications that threaten national security interests when
and where Congress has given its express authorization. 5 4 Indeed,
with virtual clairvoyance, the Justice suggested as an example that
the government and the courts may enjoin publications when authorized by Congress as under the Atomic Energy Act. 55 Accordingly, in the Progressive case, after Judge Warren wrestled with
the claim of a first amendment right to know-concluding that he
could "find no plausible reason why the public needs to know the
technical details about hydrogen bomb construction" 3' 6-he quite
properly rested with the finding that the injunction was appropriate
as contemplated by Congress. 57
In Pentagon Papers, several members of the Court anticipated
Progressive by acknowledging that the rule against prior restraints
is not absolute.35 8 More importantly, several of the opinions suggested that the government may enjoin publications when authorized by a narrowly drawn statute in order to safeguard interests in
national security.3 59 Justice White, in his concurring opinion in
Pentagon Papers, implied the existence of difficulties involved in
leaving such decisions to the courts when he wrote that "[t]o sustain
the Government

.

.

.

would start the courts down a long and

hazardous road that I am not willing to travel, at least without
congressional guidance and direction." 360 Congress and state legislatures are indeed the appropriate institutions for vindicating the
public's interests in obtaining politically and technically sensitive
materials that pertain to national security, and for determining the
nature and scope of the public's right to know. The Supreme
Court thus appears to have recognized that, within our constitutional system, the judicial forum remains inappropriate for either
353. 403 U.S. at 742, 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring). In this respect,
Justice Marshall's opinion was very similar to those of Justices Douglas, Stewart
and White, each of whom stressed the lack of congressional authorization for
restraining publication as a ground for his concurrence. See id. at 720-21
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 731-33
(White, J., concurring).
354. Id. at 743-44 (Marshall, J., concurring).
355. Id. at 743 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
356. 467 F. Supp. at 994.
357. Id. at 999-1000.
358. See note 324 and accompanying text supra.
359. See notes 350-55 and accompanying text supra. For further discussion,
see D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIc's RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 160-65 (1981).
360. 403 U.S. at 733 (White, J., concurring).
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legitimating the government's unauthorized withholding of information or fashioning a constitutional right to know in order to
augment governmental openness.
III. CONCLUSION

That members of the public and the press have increasingly
urged the Supreme Court to fashion affirmative rights to information under the first amendment is a measure of the salience of the
political ideal of freedom of information and an informed public.
Claims to a public's right to know have been made in efforts to
obtain special privileges for the press, 8 61 to permit publication and
receipt of materials constituting unprotected speech, 62 to obtain
access to governmental facilities and information,8 63 and to prevent
or invalidate prior restraints on the dissemination of political and
technical information. 364 These wide-ranging claims seek support
in a constitutional common law argument for denominating a right
to know. Contrary to the expressed view of Emerson, 65 however,
that argument enjoys faint support from the Supreme Court's rulings on the first amendment.
The contemporary attraction of freedom of information and
governmental openness has indeed prompted some members of both
the Warren and Burger Courts to accept the constitutional legitimacy of a right to know. Various justices have, on occasion, embraced claims to an enforceable right to know under the first
amendment to justify protection for the confidentiality of news
reporters' sources. 366 Moreover, several justices have construed the
first amendment to confer entitlements on the public and the press
to receive information, 367 to obtain access to governmental facilities, 368 and to an unqualified liberty to publish without prior restraint and fear of subsequent prosecution.3 69 Still, these expressions of support for a first amendment right to know remain only
in dicta and dissenting opinions, and have never been used to sup361. See notes 54-65 & 142-66 and accompanying text supra.

362. See notes 66-86 and accompanying text supra.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See notes 141-286 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 312-60 and accompanying text supra.
See also notes 17-35 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., note 56 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 111-12, 114-15, 124 & 133 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 142-70 and accompanying text supra.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J.,

concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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port claims to obtaining information from sources not voluntarily
making it available.
In retrospect a constitutional right to know appears plausible
only on the basis of a policy argument that the recognition of such
a right would entail beneficial consequences for the polity.37 0 The
historical argument proves neither compelling nor accurate with
regard to the founding period and drafting of the first amendment.3 71 Constitutional developments under the first amendment,
as the preceding discussion has shown, further undermine any recourse to constitutional history in support of a first amendment
right to know. The policy argument thus appears to be the only
possible foundation. Indeed, those justices willing to fashion a
right to know are so inclined because of their policy orientation
toward the first amendment and the role of the Court in ensuring
the political ideal of an informed public. In other words, denomination of a constitutional right to know fundamentally depends on
justices who maintain that: a) the political ideal of freedom of information and an informed public necessarily entails an affirmative
right to know; and b) in order to ensure the ideal of an informed
public, the Court may permissibly fashion such a right to know
under the first amendment.
The divisions within the Burger Court highlight the allure and
complexity of the political ideal of freedom of information and an
informed public. The Burger Court promises to remain divided
because of differences among the justices regarding the fundamental
role of the courts and the permissibility of prescriptive policymaking.
If the strength of their past opinions is any indicator, the Chief
Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist will likely remain steadfast in their denial of the constitutional legitimacy of a directly
enforceable right to know under the first amendment.3 7 2 Justices
Blackmun and White promise to agree rather consistently with
them. 873 Although agreeing that the first amendment ensures the
conditions for freedom of information, they maintain that proper
exercise of judicial power precludes both articulation of unenu370. See notes 26-33 and accompanying text supra. See also O'Brien,
supra note 31, at 609-11.
371. See O'Brien, supra note 31; notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
372. See notes 156-58 and accompanying text supra (Chief Justice Burger);
notes 59-61, 141 8c 143-46 and accompanying text supra (Justice Stewart); notes
91, 98-106, 213-18 & 283-84 and accompanying text supra (Justice Rehnquist).
373. See notes 130-33, 219-24 & 327 and accompanying text supra (Justice
Blackmun); notes 54-55, 91 & 330 and accompanying text supra (Justice White).
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merated rights and prescriptive policy-making, since the Court
thereby substitutes its wisdom for legislative judgments with respect
to government information policies. In principle, first amendment
affirmative rights are precluded, regardless of their anticipated utility
for contributing to an informed public, because the first amendment
only secures the conditions for an informed public by guaranteeing
freedom of speech and press in the absence of constitutionally permissible restraints.314 The amendment does not constitutionally
mandate the liberty, nor confer any rights, to demand information
or obtain access to governmental materials and facilities. The propriety of governmental openness with respect to documents and
other materials, or public access to facilities such as prisons and other
governmental institutions, pose issues of public policy reserved for
the legislative and executive branches. The first amendment neither
requires nor permits judicial formulation of information policies
via the denomination of novel and unenumerated rights.
In contrast, Justices Brennan and Marshall are the principal
proponents of first amendment affirmative action because they apparently believe both that the first amendment does not prohibit
what it does not require, and that a judicially created constitutional
right to know serves important policy objectives. 75 Accordingly,
they demonstrate a willingness to engage the Court in reviewing
government policies which they believe unjustifiably limit the free
flow of information essential to an informed public. While Justices
Stevens and Powell maintain that a right of the public to know
about governmental operations is defensible in terms of vindicating
the interests of an informed public, they disagree with Justices
Brennan and Marshall on the scope of first amendment substantive
protection and, specifically, on the permissible scope of a constitutional right to know. 7 6 Justices Stevens and Powell may well
abandon Justices Brennan and Marshall, as they did in Gannett,
when they find that the government has, in a reasonable manner,
considered the interests of an informed public when denying access
77
to particular materials, proceedings, or facilities.
Within the constitutional framework of our representative republic, as a majority of the Burger Court recognizes, the hard
374. See text accompanying notes 66-78 & 291-318 supra.
375. See notes 124, 133 & 276-82 and accompanying text supra (Justice
Brennan); notes 109-11, 133 & 334-49 and accompanying text supra (Justice
Marshall).
376. See notes 163-66 and accompanying text supra (Justice Stevens); notes

150-55 & 205-12 and accompanying text supra (Justice Powell).
377. See notes 185-227 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss1/1

60

O'Brien: Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in
1980-1981]

REASSESSING

THE RIGHT TO KNOW

questions in terms of what the public has a right to know require
legislative determinations, not judicial proclamations. Indeed,
apart from the historical background and understanding of the first
amendment,378 there are several policy considerations that caution
against judicial construction of an affirmative constitutional right
to know. While recognition of a right to know no more assures an
informed public than does safeguarding express first amendment
guarantees so as to insure dissemination of wide-ranging information and opinions,37 9 denomination of such a constitutional right
might well produce unanticipated and inauspicious consequences
for the courts and the public. Legitimating an affirmative constitutional right to know inevitably leads to determinations of what the
public has or has not a right to know, and resulting determinations
of what the public does not have a right to know may well entail
restrictions on freedom of speech and press. In other words, elaboration of the public's right to know might well prove pernicious
because courts must balance the public's need to know against
governmental interests in limited access, confidentiality and freedom
from interruptions in the conduct of its operations. The potential
for prior restraint which attends the necessity of the courts determining what the public is entitled to know, moreover, indicates
further deleterious consequences. Judicial determinations would
be substituted for legislative and political evaluations. Thus, upon
fashioning a constitutional right to know, the Supreme Court would
be destined to assume the role of super-legislature-determining the
wisdom, need, and propriety of permitting public access to legislative and executive materials, policy-making processes, and governmental institutions. 380
The Supreme Court's failure to denominate a first amendment
right to know, therefore, does not reflect insensitivity to the political
ideal of freedom of information and an informed public. Rather
it reflects a refusal to engage in extra-constitutional decision-making.
Indeed, recent rulings in the commercial speech area 381 illustrate
the important ways in which the political ideal of freedom of information and an informed public remains integral to first amendment analysis. First amendment guarantees for free speech and
378. See O'Brien, supra note 31.
379. See Bathory & McWilliams, Political Theory and the People's Right
to Know, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 3-21 (I. Galnoor ed. 1977).
O'Brien, supra note 31, at 605-12.
380. See notes 143-62 & 334-60 and accompanying text supra.
381. See notes 87-106 and accompanying text supra.
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press ensure the conditions for an informed public only by safeguarding the dissemination of information against constitutionally
impermissible restraints or constraints. 8 2 The amendment neither
mandates nor entitles the Supreme Court to fashion unenumerated
affirmative rights so as to enhance the prospects for governmental
openness. On the other hand, the first amendment does not prohibit or foreclose the possibility of Congress and the executive
branch adopting policies promoting public access to government
materials and facilities. Indeed, Congress in the last decade has
enacted extensive legislation designed to further the ideal of freedom of information and an informed public. 883 In particular the
Freedom of Information Act 384 established a statutory right to know
in mandating public access to federal documents, records, and other
materials, except where subject to statutory exemption.38 5 The
impressive successes over the last decade by Congress and state legislatures in furthering governmental openness and freedom of information, and the dangers inherent in constitutional theory and practice for the Court's denomination of a first amendment right to
know, underscore the appropriateness of legislatures and political
processes for translating the political ideal of freedom of information
into affirmative rights of access to government materials and
facilities.
In historical perspective, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the importance of freedom of information and an informed public,
but has construed that ideal to attain constitutional fulfillment by
safeguarding the express guarantees of the first amendment. Instead
of cultivating a constitutional right to know against the government,
the Court has recognized the limits of its guardianship and that the
hard questions posed by claims to a right to know are ultimately
matters of public policy reserved for Congress, state legislatures,
and the executive branches of government. Thus, the Burger
Court's analysis of the first amendment and claims to a right to
know demonstrate an appreciation for the integrity and limitations
,of the judicial power and the first amendment.
382. See text accompanying notes 43-44 & 291-318 supra.
383. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II
1978); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); Federal Ad-

visory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.
1-14 (Supp. I 1978).
384. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 &Supp. 11 1978).
385. Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9). For a discussion of the act and agency implementation, see O'Brien, supra note 314, at 56-61; Symposium, The Freedom of
Information Act a Decade Later, 39 Pun. AD. REV. 310-32 (1979).
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